# Neg v Minn CE

## 1nc

### T – Substantial

**Interpretation: Substantially is at least 90%**

**Words and Phrases, 05** (v. 40B, p. 329)

N.H. 1949. **The word “substantially**” as used in provision of Unemployment Compensation Act that experience rating of an employer may be transferred to an employing unit which acquires the organization, trade, or business, or “substantially” all of the assets thereof, **is an elastic term** which does not include a definite, fixed amount of percentage, **and** the transfer **does not have to be 100 per cent but cannot be less than 90 per cent in the ordinary situation**. R.L. c 218, § 6, subd. F, as added by Laws 1945, c.138, § 16.

#### Violation: They only increase nuclear power by a small amount

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Ground—big cases are key to our DAs

#### 2. Limits—they justify infinite tiny affs

### Courts

#### The United States Supreme Court should rule that compliance orders from federal enforcement agencies regarding restrictions on the production of crude oil in Virginia’s Outer Continental Shelf are unconstitutional.

#### This solves and competes – it doesn’t ‘reduce’ a legal restriction – it just makes it unenforceable

William **Treanor** (associate professor of law at Fordham University) **and** Gene **Sperling** (Deputy assistant to the president for economic policy University of Minnesota) **1993** “Prospective overruling and the revival of Unconstitutional statutes” JSTOR

Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is over- turned.42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes are immediately enforceable. The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pro- nounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General HomerCummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded, The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a stat- ute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective.43 Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action.44 When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia inJawish v. Morlet 45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date.46 The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in ac- cord with the principle 'that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdic- tion overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' "47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, "'[J]ust about everybody was fooled.' "48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it.49 Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result as theJawish court, using a similar formalisticanalysis.50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jeferson,51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jeferson sought child sup- port and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Ap- peals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the ap- plicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated: Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial de- cree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to con- stitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court-an assumption of legislative power not dele- gated to it by the Constitution.52 The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival there- fore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making. Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of pow- ers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jeferson rationale, a "re- vived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legis- lative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions.53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.

### Politics

#### Hagel will win confirmation – but only after a bloody fight that drains every ounce of his political capital keeping democrats in line

Michael Falcone (writer for ABC News) January 7, 2013 “Cabinet Shakeup: No Such Thing As A ‘Slam Dunk’ (The Note)” http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/01/cabinet-shakeup-no-such-thing-as-a-slam-dunk-the-note/

But as ABC Chief White House Correspondent Jon Karl notes today, the confirmation of Hagel, a former Republican senator, “will be no slam dunk”: “Senate Democrats tell me there is no guarantee Hagel will win confirmation and that, as of right now, there are enough Democratic Senators with serious concerns about Hagel to put him below 50 votes. The bottom line: He may ultimately win confirmation, but not before a bloody fight in the Senate. On the plus side, Hagel is a decorated Vietnam veteran and a former Republican Senator who’s views on military issues closely match the president’s views. But he has already come under withering criticism from across the political spectrum. Among other things, he has come under fire for controversial comments on Israel (in 2008, he referred to Israel’s US supporters as ‘the Jewish lobby’), his opposition to some sanctions against Iran, and his suggestion, also in 2008, that the U.S. should negotiate with Hamas.” Time Magazine’s Mark Halperin had a similar prediction: “If Hagel has a good confirmation sherpa and performs well in his courtesy calls and at his hearings, he will likely be confirmed. But/and at a pretty high cost. Expect a LOT of people to want to testify against him. And don’t rule out a filibuster of this nomination, which would, obviously, change the math.” http://ti.me/VvwfU0 More on the rough road ahead for Hagel from ABC’s Martha Raddatz on”Good Morning America” today. WATCH: http://abcn.ws/VNTZBZ NOTED! ABC’s RICK KLEIN: It’s getting crowded in here. One consequence of the un-grand bargain is that Washington will be fighting fiscal battles again early this year — then likely later, too. The result is not just a feeling of déjà vu but of suffocation. Republicans and any coalition that wants to slow President Obama’s agenda — on immigration, gun control, energy policy, what have you — has the perfect way to do so now, perhaps indefinitely. “None of these issues, I think, will have the kind of priority that spending and debt are going to have over the next two or three months,” Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said on ABC’s “This Week” yesterday. ABC’s AMY WALTER: For all the hand wringing about upcoming fights between the White House and Congress over Chuck Hagel, the debt ceiling and the sequester, a reminder that the two branches were designed to challenge each other. To be sure, this is a frustrating process— and one that has resulted in less than ideal outcomes. Voters say they like the idea of divided government, but they don’t like the reality of it. “THIS WEEK” REWIND: MCCONNELL: THE TAX ISSUE IS FINISHED. As President Obama and Republicans slowly approach the next round of deficit-reduction talks, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell drew a line in the sand, in his interview with ABC’s George Stephanopoulos: no more tax increases. McConnell: “The tax issue is finished, over, completed. That’s behind us. Now the question is, what are we going to do about the biggest problem confronting our country and our future? And that’s our spending addiction. It’s time to confront it. The president surely knows that. I mean, he has mentioned it both publicly and privately. The time to confront it is now.” http://abcn.ws/Xbz4uz HEITKAMP: GUNG-CONTROL PROPOSALS ‘WAY IN EXTREME.’ After The Washington Post reported that Vice President Biden’s working group will press a broad gun-control agenday, newly elected Democratic Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, N.D., told ABC’s George Stephanopoulos those proposals would go to far. Heitkamp: “Let’s start addressing the problem. And to me, one of the issues that I think comes — screams out of this is the issue of mental health and the care for the mentally ill in our country, especially the dangerously mentally ill. And so we need to have a broad discussion before we start talking about gun control. … I think you need to put everything on the table, but what I hear from the administration — and if the Washington Post is to be believed — that’s way — way in extreme of what I think is necessary or even should be talked about. And it’s not going to pass.” GRETA VAN SUSTEREN GOES ON THE RECORD (WITH ABC NEWS): Fox News’ Greta Van Susteren has interviewed some of the biggest names in U.S. politics on her show, “On The Record,” but you’ll never guess who her dream guest dream political guest is. Van Susteren, who appeared on the “This Week” roundtable Sunday, answered viewer questions from Facebook and Twitter for an “All Politics is Social” web exclusive hosted by ABC’s Kaye Foley. About that dream guest, here’s her answer: “Bo, the first dog. I love animals. I’d love to be on Animal Planet. On Animal Planet you aren’t dealing with death and destruction and people fighting with each other all the time. To the extent that Bo is a part of politics, I’d love to interview Bo. Plus, I love the fact that he looks like he’s wearing white knee socks. Bo is my favorite.” WATCH the full interview: http://abcn.ws/13bVdfF THE BUZZ: with ABC’s Chris Good (@c\_good) SCOTUS RETURNS: GAY MARRIAGE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, VOTING RIGHTS. The Supreme Court returns to the bench today, and ABC’s Ariane de Vogue reports: The justices will hear two potentially blockbuster cases in March concerning gay marriage. One of the cases–Hollingsworth v. Perry–addresses whether there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. The other–Windsor v. United States–deals with the federal law that defines marriage as between a man and a woman. In both cases, the court will hear arguments on potential procedural obstacles that could stop it from getting to the core constitutional questions. The court will also hear a case challenging a key provision of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 of the law says that certain states with a history of voter discrimination must clear any changes to their election laws with federal officials in Washington. Lawyers for Shelby County, Ala., are challenging the constitutionality of Section 5. The case, called Shelby County v. Holder, will be argued Feb. 27. The day before, the court will hear arguments in Maryland v. King, a case about whether Maryland officials can collect DNA from someone who has been arrested but not convicted of a crime. http://abcn.ws/WD3Fir SANDY AND THE CLIFF: WILL PAUL RYAN’S VOTES HAUNT HIM IN 2016? Paul Ryan voted in favor of the “fiscal cliff” tax deal but against a Hurricane Sandy relief bill that would add $9.7 billion in debt. ABC’s Shushannah Walshe reports on the potential implications for 2016: The two votes four years from now may mean nothing or could haunt Ryan if he decides to run for president in 2016, depending on who is battling for the nomination. The fiscal cliff vote could become an issue, particularly if his opponent is Florida Sen. Marco Rubio who could highlight the fact that Ryan voted for the measure while Rubio voted against it. The Sandy vote could also be resurrected if his rival is New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie who blasted members of his own party this week when Boehner decided not to vote on a $60 billion Sandy relief package after assuring lawmakers from the affected he states he would. … Will Ryan be more vocal on the looming battle to raise the debt ceiling? It will be one to watch. http://abcn.ws/Sb0YZE OBAMA’S VACATION BY THE NUMBERS. With President Obama returning from a nine-day vacation in Hawaii with family and friends, ABC’s Mary Bruce reports: Obama played FIVE rounds of golf with SEVEN different partners, spending roughly THIRTY hours on TWO different courses on Oahu. The president made FIVE early morning trips to the gym at the nearby Marine Base at Kaneohe Bay. … The Obamas ventured out for dinner with friends FOUR times, leaving their Kailua vacation home for gourmet Japanese meals at Nobu and Morimoto … The president interrupted his vacation for SIX days to negotiate the “fiscal cliff” in Washington. All told, he will have spent roughly FORTY hours on Air Force One flying between D.C. and Hawaii. http://abcn.ws/WA0xUx PELOSI: MORE TAXES IN NEXT CLIFF DEAL. The fiscal cliff isn’t quite over, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi says tax revenues must be on the table as President Obama and congressional Republicans negotiate over how to avert budget sequestration. The Hill’s Mike Lillis reports: “‘In this legislation we had $620 billion, very significant … changing the high-end tax rate to 39.6 percent. But that is not enough on the revenue side,’ Pelosi told CBS’s Bob Schieffer in an interview taped Friday. Without offering many specifics, the California Democrat said she wants to scour the tax code for unnecessary loopholes and ‘unfair’ benefits that help those–either companies or individuals–who don’t need it.” http://bit.ly/WnUi5y CHUCK HAGEL: LET THE SNIPING BEGIN. Rumblings on Capitol Hill, already, are not good. Politico’s Scott Wong and Manu Raju report: “Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), an Air Force reservist who serves on the Armed Services Committee that will consider the nod, said Hagel would hold the ‘most antagonistic’ views toward Israel of any defense secretary in U.S. history. … ‘It is a strange signal for the White House to send that they are willing to fight for Hagel but not Rice,’ one Senate Democratic aide said Sunday. ‘Democrats are not currently unified behind Hagel, and it will take some real work by the administration to get them there, if it’s even possible.’ ‘I can’t imagine why [Obama] would choose to burn his political capital on this nomination. For what? There is no constituency for Chuck Hagel,’ one senior GOP aide said. ‘Obama will expend every ounce of political capital he has to get him across the finish line. Dems will hate this.” <http://politi.co/VFMgc7>

#### Congressional opposition is divisive enough to block the aff

**Morgan, 11** (Curtis, Tampa Bay Times, “A year after Deepwater Horizon disaster, opposition to oil drilling fades” 4/18, <http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/a-year-after-deepwater-horizon-disaster-opposition-to-oil-drilling-fades/1164429>) **Nelson=Florida Senator Bill Nelson, Fuller = Manley Fuller, president of the Florida Wildlife Federation**

In Washington, the Obama administration has adopted what Interior Secretary Salazar called a "thoughtful and deliberate approach'' to reopening the gulf, with a new oversight agency and new safety measures — notably, one mandating that the industry develop deep-water containment systems for worst-case blowouts, like the one that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon.¶ In October, the White House lifted the drilling ban it imposed after the BP spill but didn't start issuing new permits until last month, approving 10 new deep water wells so far, with 15 more in process. The administration also agreed to open new territory for exploration by selling new leases — but only in the already heavily drilled central and western gulf.¶ The three bills approved by a House committee last week don't target Florida waters specifically but lawmakers potentially could use them as tools to carve out prime areas for drilling, or shrink or lift the moratorium.¶ For now, with the House and Senate controlled by different parties, it's doubtful any drilling bill can make it out of Congress. Nelson and most environmentalists believe the ban on Florida's federal waters can survive political pressure and maneuvering.¶ "President Obama would have to lose and Bill Nelson would have to lose and they'd have to be replaced by people who want to remove that boundary,'' said Fuller of the Florida Wildlife Federation. "I don't think that is going to happen.''¶ A more serious threat, they say, is the possibility of a future Florida Legislature opening up state-controlled waters. That move would make it politically difficult to justify a continuing federal ban.¶ A coalition of environmental groups, Save Our Seas, Beaches and Shores, launched a petition drive after the 2009 House vote to put a ban on drilling in state waters into the Florida Constitution. Former Gov. Charlie Crist's effort to do the same thing during a special legislative session in July proved dead on arrival.¶ So far, Fuller acknowledged, only a few thousand signatures have been gathered through an online site, far short of the nearly 700,000 needed. In February, Crist's former chief financial officer, Alex Sink, who lost the governor's race to Scott, agreed to co-chair the petition drive with the goal of getting an amendment proposal on the ballot by 2012 or, more realistically, the following year.¶ Fuller doesn't anticipate lawmakers trying to ram through a divisive drilling bill in the near future but "that is one reason why we want it in the Constitution. We don't want to see it as a possibility at all.''

#### Now is pivotal – strengthening Israeli Lobby clout ensures broad war with Iran – otherwise peaceful negotiations will solve

Kaveh L Afrasiabi (former political science professor at Tehran University, Boston Universityand Bentley College. He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard University, UC Berkeley, Binghamton University, Center For Strategic Research, Tehran and Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris) December 22, 2012 “ Middle East peace hinges on will” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/NL22Ak05.html

The cause of peace is predicated on the propensity of decision-makers to opt for peaceful resolution of conflicts. While there are nearly always a host of historical and political factors that trigger conflicts, the optimal necessity for bringing those conflicts to an end always revolves around the will towards peace, an important ingredient often missing in the Middle East. By all indications, 2013 will be a pivotal year for war and peace in the Middle East. The questions of who will gain the upper hand and whether the region will experience positive or negative development are difficult if not impossible to predict, but trends are unmistakable and tabulating them individually helps to decipher the evolving dynamics. To begin with, we can safely assume that the tumults of state-building in post-Arab Spring countries will continue in Tunisia and Egypt, and that Bahrain and Jordan will likely experience a continuation of the political struggle for change. It seems clear that the Kurdish issue in Iraq will grow more prominent and that Baghdad will be more beset with problems of terrorism and political factionalism. It can also be assumed that the Saudis will continue to struggle with issues of succession, and internal and regional instability; that regime change will rear as an issue in Syria; and that Israel's expansionism will be left unchecked by the US and other Western powers. The Iran nuclear standoff will still likely dominate the foreign policy agenda of the second Obama administration, particularly if the "Israel Lobby" has its say. But there are also doubts in the year. For example, what are the chances that the Syrian regime will survive in 2013? Or the Saudi-backed Bahraini regime, or Egypt's Mohamed Morsi administration? Is it feasible that the US, led by a new secretary of state, could start pressing Israel for a viable peace process, as well as for a peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear standoff? The fundamental ambiguity surrounding such questions stems from our inability to predict the nature of policies that will be adopted and pursued by the multiple actors, given the welter of policy options that individually or collective can tip the balance towards or away from war or peace. Geopolitically, the struggle over Syria will be the dominant issue in the coming year, in light of the country's strategic significance. Should Damascus falls to the Western and Saudi-backed rebels, this would create a significant shift in the regional balance. The trend is toward a re-enactment of the Libya scenario, where parts of Syria are declared a North Atlantic Treaty Organization-protected "no fly zone". However, any regime change process could be accelerated by the introduction of chemical warfare, considered the US's "red line". A United Nations peacekeeping force may be stationed in a de facto partitioned Syria, but that would require a more durable rebel advance and an ability to retain zones of control, which may or may not happen in the coming months, given the conflict's fluidity. For those seeking genuine peace in Syria, there is no doubt that in 2013 that much more attention must be given to the role of the UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, who insists on the need for a political dialogue between the embattled government and the opposition. A new peace process There is broad consensus in policy circles around the world that a push for a new Middle East peace process is urgently called for. The week-long Gaza war in October and the subsequent Israeli announcement of new settlement expansions - as well as Palestine's acension to observer status at the UN - have breathed new impetus into pursuing what is needed and yet continues to be ignored by Washington. Obama will lose face in the world if he ignores this priority any further. He should appoint a new special envoy, direct his new secretary of state to pursue another Camp David meeting with the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, and send clear signals to Israel that it must halt land-grab actions that defy international law. Most likely, Israel will placate such US demands to some extent but only on the condition of a much tougher US approach toward Iran. The problem with this request, however, is that it militates against the improving conditions for fruitful nuclear talks. If Iran is handed such a setback in Syria, this could derail talks over Tehran's nuclear program, as it would result in heightened national security concerns. Syria has afforded both Russia and more recently Iran a Mediterranean foothold that is too valuable in the strategic realm to give up without a big fight, given the global spread of US and NATO power, so it is a given that Tehran and Moscow will do all they can to prevent Assad's demise. On the other hand, should Iran take a proactive role in shaping an orderly post al-Assad Syria - akin to the part it played at the 2001 Bonn summit on Afghanistan - then this may ease Iran-US tensions. What is clear, however, is that Iran is strongly opposed to foreign intervention in Syria and will likely increase its military assistance to Damascus in parallel with increased foreign meddling. A greater proxy war throughout the Middle East is thus anything but foreclosed, particularly if the US steps up its counter-Iran strategy. This brings us to a consideration of the chance for Iran nuclear talks succeeding in 2013. Prospects for Iran nuclear talks It is likely we will witness a major breakthrough in the Iran nuclear standoff in 2013. Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are making decent progress to reach a new modality for cooperation (see Iran nuclear talks produce a litmus test, Asia Times Online, December 18, 2012 ) and this should set a positive tone for the multilateral talks between Iran and the "5 +1" nations (the United Nations Security Council's permanent five members plus Germany). Guarded optimism is therefore not out of place, since Iran's nuclear program remains under the IAEA's supervision and Tehran has backed away from certain steps that could be deemed provocative, such as amassing a high volume of 20% enriched uranium. It has instead displayed concrete signs of its willingness to build confidence with the West, reaching out to sections of the Syrian opposition and playing a more active role in regional conflict management. But will Israel and its powerful lobby in Washington succeed in torpedoing the potential for a breakthrough in the nuclear crisis? This crucial question hinges on the ability of the White House to devise a sound Middle East policy in 2013 that does not cater to Israel's warmongering. Already, there are serious efforts by the Jewish Lobby under way to ensure that after the "fiscal cliff", the US's highest priority should be "preventing a nuclear Iran", to paraphrase a policy article in Wall Street Journal, dated December 17, penned by Charles Webb, Dennis Ross and Michael Makovsky. A clue to the absurd nature of Iranophobic discourse in the US, this seminal article makes a strong pitch for Obama's prioritization of the Iran threat by describing the fictitious scenario of a "Saudi-Iran nuclear exchange". Unfortunately, no matter how absurd, the pro-Israel lobbyists are busy at work in Washington and it remains to be seen if Obama can withstand their pressure. Lest we forget, the first Obama administration's Iran engagement policy was a dismal failure, due mainly to contradictory and half-hearted mini-steps poorly articulated at the strategic level, and not the least because of the influence of such ardent voices of Israel within the administration such as Dennis Ross. Whether or not the second Obama administration can improve and diversify its Iran policy skills is an important question that will have significant implications for the broader US Middle Eastern policy. A new foreign policy team determined to reach out for genuine dialogue with Tehran is desperately needed in Washington, and in the coming weeks and months we will have a clearer picture that would shed lights on the answer to this question.

#### Extinction

The Nation, 2005[8/6, Lexis]

The above analysis vividly indicates US aggressive intentions on some pretext against Iran. US at present is covertly aligning her allies against Iran and looking for the opportunity to initiate the offensive. The most probable hypothesis is that US would make Iran’s nuclear development programme the pretext for launching offensive. Under such an eventuality Russia would guard Iran’s interest to pre-empt US intrusion towards CAS and Russia. Any offensive action of US on Iran would amount to annexation of Gwadar Port and Karachi Port for making a ‘bridge-head’. She would make safe access for India to provide logistic support to the US forces. In this regard she would neutralise Pakistan military capabilities through electronic jamming and containing its troops through limited offensive on Eastern and Western borders and to block and keep China away from the battlefield. Both US and India know that any intrusion in Pakistan would invoke China’s bitter reaction against them. All these reactions would result into a world war. In brief the big powers would make Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as the battleground. In this scenario both India and Israel would launch pre-emptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear strongholds and defence installations. As declared by Pakistan that any attempt on its nuclear installation would amount to strong reaction against that country. This reaction, under all possibility, would initiate nuclear war. Both Russia and China would also react to guard their strategic interests in Iran and Pakistan respectively. Initiation of nuclear weapons would amount to mass destruction and elimination of most of the global civilisation.

### CP

Counterplan: The United States federal government should provide $3 billion to Virginia’s state government on the condition that they provide sufficient grants for biotechnology research focusing on immortality. The United States federal government should require that the annual Harbor Maintenance Tax revenue be made fully available for port modernization Economy Advantage

#### Dredging key-otherwise martime industry and US economy will collapse

Weakley, Lake Carriers’ Association president, 2008

(James, “Realize America’s Maritime Promise”, 4-30, <http://www.ramphmtf.org/speeches_043008.html>, DOA: 7-12-12)

Port-related jobs are critical to augment our economy. Direct and indirect jobs generated by ports result in the employment of more than 8 million Americans who earned and spent $314.5 billion in 2006. Every $1 billion in exports alone creates an estimated 15, 000 new jobs. In Texas alone one in every four jobs is linked to trade. ¶ America´s deep-draft navigation system is at a crossroads, with a future that can be bright or bleak. Our waterways´ ability to support the Nation?s continuing growth in trade and in the defense of our Nation, hinges on much-needed Federal attention to unresolved funding needs that are derailing critical channel maintenance and deep-draft construction projects of the water highways to our ports. Because most ports do not have naturally deep harbors, they must be regularly dredged to allow ships to move safely through Federal navigation channels. Also, as modern vessels increase in size, navigation channel depths must increase accordingly, if we are to continue to be a player on the international marketplace. A recent U.S. Army Corps of Engineers study reports that almost 30 percent of the 95, 550 vessel calls at U.S. ports are constrained due to inadequate channel depths. Ladies and gentlemen, these are the things that cause port directors nightmares.¶ Without a channel dredged to its authorized depth, nothing else comes into play. Attracting new customers, dealing with labor issues, environmental concerns, and the public - all go away - because without a properly-dredged channel, business goes away. Public ports are at a critical state in keeping their channels open for business. We are losing existing business and potential new business to ports outside of the United States and once lost, it is rarely regained. ¶ Dredging can literally make or break our industry, and a lack of dredging is an issue throughout the United States. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that in many parts of the United States, we face a dredging crisis. On the Great Lakes, as Chairman James L. Oberstar of this Committee and Chairman David R. Obey of the Appropriations Committee well know, decades of inadequate funding for dredging have left a backlog of 18 million cubic yards of sediment. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates removing the backlog will cost more than $230 million on the Great Lakes alone. In some cases, ports on the Great Lakes have actually shutdown due to inadequate dredging. There are similar examples of dredging problems in ports and harbors on all coasts of our Nation. ¶ In many cases, vessels must ?load light? because of dredging shortfalls. The economic implications of light loading are enormous. On the Great Lakes, for example, vessels lose between 50 to 270 tons of cargo for each inch they must reduce their draft and, in some areas, the lost draft is measured in feet, not inches. Light loading because of inadequate dredging impacts everyone. A ship that is light-loaded reduces its efficiencies in the same way that a commercial airplane that is required to set aside seats with no passengers would quickly lose its efficiencies. ¶ The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund¶ The Harbor Maintenance Tax and the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund were established in the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986. The Trust Fund (HMTF) applies a 0.125 percent ad valorem tax on the value of commercial cargo loaded or unloaded on vessels using Federally-maintained channels. The tax is only assessed on imports and domestic cargo, as it was ruled as an unconstitutional assessment on exports in a 1998 Supreme Court ruling. This Fund - that you, members of Congress - established, was authorized to be utilized to recover 100 percent of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers eligible Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenditures for commercial navigation, along with 100 percent of the O&M cost of the St. Lawrence Seaway, certain costs of NOAA, and the costs to Customs to collect the tax. ¶ Fixing the Problem¶ Ladies and gentleman - would it surprise you to know that this utilization has not been honored? HMTF revenues exceed transfers for authorized activities by an increasing margin. Yet, our Federal channels are not being maintained at authorized depths. The Fund is being held hostage to paper balance the budget - interestingly, not one of its legal uses. In 2007, the HMTF began with a $3.3 billion surplus and collected an additional $1.4 billion - resulting in a $4.7 billion surplus, while only $751 million was utilized for maintenance dredging. That is incredible. I would ask that you consider this analogy offered by my colleague in a Gulf Coast port: "What would you say to a toll booth operator who took your money to use the toll road only to then tell you that the road was unusable?"? ¶ That is what is happening to shippers who pay this tax every day. We must solve this problem. We must draft legislation that mandates that the Fund be utilized for its intended purpose - the maintenance dredging of Federal ports and harbors. There are a number of ways to address this problem. As you know, other modes of transportation - surface transportation and aviation ? have faced similar problems in the past decade. Although we are in the early stages of addressing this problem, our Coalition believes Congress should consider an approach similar to that taken with the Highway Trust Fund in 1998 and with the Airport and Airway Trust Fund in 2000. In those cases, Congress legislatively enacted "firewalls" around the Trust Funds ? essentially guaranteeing minimum levels of spending that could only be used to support eligible projects. Although there are some variations between the Highway, Aviation, and Harbor Maintenance Trust, the point of a firewall in each case is the same - ensuring that monies from a tax would be used for their intended purpose and not merely for deficit reduction.

### Neolib K

#### Financialization of energy production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—fuels inequality and unsustainable practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The **financialisation**¶ **of “energy**”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ **jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just**¶ **transition** to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies **marginalise the role of communities** and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over **how society might be differently organised** to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology in the neoliberal frame generates crises and precludes other orientations

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As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ belies the notion that “there is no alternative.” They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our ¶ environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ planetary boundaries will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

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The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable ¶ policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to ¶ function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for ¶ communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### Oil

#### Prices will stick above 100/barrel

Andrey Kompaneyets 12-29-2012; writer for Voice of Russia, Will oil price soar in 2013? <http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_12_29/Will-oil-price-soar-in-2013/>

In 2012 the oil price which is one of the key global economic factors was between $92 and $125 a barrel. The Voice of Russia has prepared its own forecast of oil rates for the upcoming year. Next year’s oil price will be about $100 on average but if the situation in the Middle East explodes oil could hit the level of $200, experts say. For the whole of 2012 oil prices remained within a comfortable range for the global economy, without any serious ups or downs. Experts point out that moderate fluctuations satisfy everyone. Analyst Vitaly Krukov from IFD Kapital Group expects the average oil price to remain on the level of 2012. “The oil price is expected to remain at the level of $100. I don’t believe that price fluctuations will be considerable because geopolitical factors have had a marked influence in recent months and next year is unlikely to bring any change in this respect.”

#### The plan collapses oil prices overnight – signal of federal support is key

Steven Poruban 3-26-2012 "API: Raising US oil supplies key to lowering gasoline prices" 3/26 www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-3c/general-interest/api-raising-us-oil.html

A major component to relieving upward pressure on gasoline prices in the US will come from increasing domestic oil production and not from raising taxes, American Petroleum Institute Pres. and Chief Executive Officer Jack Gerard told reporters Mar. 20 during a conference call from Washington, DC. He said President Barack Obama's administration needs a "reality check" as well as a revision to the unclear signals it is sending the market. This is something that US voters understand as well, Gerard noted, citing statistics from a poll conducted earlier this month by Harris Interactive on behalf of API among 1,009 registered voters in the US. "Voters understand that raising taxes is not a solution for high gasoline prices," Gerard said, adding, "No economist in the world will tell you gas prices can be reduced by increasing taxes, and the Congressional Research Service just released a study saying so," Gerard said. "A true all-of-the-above energy strategy would include greater access to areas that are currently off limits, a regulatory and permitting process that supported reasonable timelines for development, and immediate approval of the Keystone XL pipeline to bring more Canadian oil to US refineries. This would send a positive signal to the market and could help put downward pressure on prices," he said. A large majority of these polled voters, API said, "also believe that more US oil and natural gas development could reduce gasoline prices (81%), lead to more American jobs (90%), and enhance America's energy security (84%)." Gerard said, "Most US resources have been placed off-limits. The US oil and natural gas industry is currently allowed to explore, develop, and produce on less than 15% of the federal offshore areas. More than 85% of those areas are off limits, denying all Americans the benefits of producing those resources—benefits like greater supplies of crude oil and natural gas, job creation, and significant returns on our treasury in taxes, rents, royalties, and bonus bids." Market perception The very notion that the Obama administration is proposing the release of oil supplies from the nation's Strategic Petroleum Reserve or asking other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to boost oil production, is a "clear admissions that supply matters" in the case of relieving gasoline price pressure, Gerard said. Markets are largely driven by perception, Gerard said, and when Obama in his early days in office sent out the message to the market that oil and gas production from the Gulf of Mexico, for example, would be higher today than it was then, that is part of the reason we're experiencing higher gasoline prices in the US. To illustrate this point about clear market signals, Gerard recalled the example of when US gasoline prices were surpassing $4/gal during George W. Bush's presidency, his administration lifted the moratorium on offshore drilling and in a matter of days, oil prices fell by $15-16/bbl.

#### High prices are key to the Russian economy and domestic stability

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China**.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### Adv 1

**No econ impact**

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

**The economy is resilient**

**Washington Times 2008** – chief political correspondent for The Washington Times (7/28, Donald Lambro, The Washington Times, "Always darkest before dawn", lexis, WEA)

The doom-and-gloomers are still with us, of course, and they will go to their graves forecasting that life as we know it is coming to an end and that we are in for years of economic depression and recession. Last week, the New York Times ran a Page One story maintaining that Americans were saving less than ever, and that their debt burden had risen by an average of $117,951 per household. And the London Telegraph says there are even harder times ahead, comparing today's economy to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Wall Street economist David Malpass thinks that kind of fearmongering is filled with manipulated statistics that ignore long-term wealth creation in our country, as well as globally. Increasingly, people are investing "for the long run - for capital gains (not counted in savings) rather than current income - in preparation for retirement," he told his clients last week. Instead of a coming recession, "we think the U.S. is in gradual recovery after a sharp two-quarter slowdown, with consumer resilience more likely than the decades-old expectation of a consumer slump," Mr. Malpass said. "Fed data shows clearly that household savings of all types - liquid, financial and tangible - are still close to the record levels set in September. IMF data shows U.S. households holding more net financial savings than the rest of the world combined. Consumption has repeatedly outperformed expectations in recent quarters and year," he said. The American economy has been pounded by a lot of factors, including the housing collapse (a needed correction to bring home prices down to earth), the mortgage scandal and the meteoric rise in oil and gas prices. But this $14 trillion economy, though slowing down, continues to grow by about 1 percent on an annualized basis, confounding the pessimists who said we were plunging into a recession, defined by negative growth over two quarters. That has not happened - yet. Call me a cockeyed optimist, but I do not think we are heading into a recession. On the contrary, I'm more bullish than ever on our economy's long-term prospects.

**There in so such thing as the global economy—economic links are regional**

**Fletcher 2010** – Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of the U.S. Business and Industry Council (7/7, Ian, Huffington Post, “The myth of the global economy”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/the-myth-of-the-global-ec\_b\_638546.html, props to Mustafa for the cite, WEA)

If there's one thing everyone knows these days, whether they're happy about it or not, it's that we live in a "global" economy. This fact is taken as so obvious that anyone who disputes it is regarded as not so much wrong as simply ignorant -- not even worth arguing with. So it may come as a shock to many that, in reality, the cliche that we live in a borderless global economy does not survive serious examination. The key is to ignore the Thomas Friedmanesque rhetoric the media is flooded with and get down to some hard numbers. The easiest hard number is this: Because the U.S. is roughly 25 percent of the world economy, a truly borderless world would imply that imports and exports would each make up 75 percent of our economy, since our purchase and sale transactions would be distributed around the world. This would entail a total trade level (imports plus exports) of 150 percent of GDP. Instead, our total trade level is 29 percent: imports are 17 percent and exports 12 percent. So our economy is nowhere near borderless. Furthermore, as our trade is almost certainly destined to be balanced by import contraction, rather than an export boom, in the next few years, our trade level is almost certainly poised to go down, not up. So unless the U.S. can somehow magically find a way to keep sucking in $300 to $700 billion a year in imports it doesn't pay for with exports, America in a few years will be importing significantly less and will be a less globalized economy. A truly unified world economy would also mean that rates of interest and profit would have to be equal everywhere--because if they weren't, the differences would be arbitraged away by the financial markets. But this is nowhere near being the case: Interest rates and corporate profits vary widely around the world. Economists James Anderson and Eric van Wincoop have calculated that the average cost of international trade (ignoring tariffs) is the equivalent of a 170 percent tariff. Even between adjacent and similar nations like the U.S. and Canada, national borders still count: Canadian economist John McCallum has documented that trade between Canadian provinces is on average 20 times as large as the corresponding trade between Canadian provinces and American states. And much of international trade is interregional anyway, not global, being centered on European, North American, and East Asian blocs; this is true for just under 50 percent of both agriculture and manufactured goods. In reality, the world economy remains what it has been for a very long time: a thin crust of genuinely global economy (more visible than its true size due to its concentration in media, finance, technology, and luxury goods) over a network of regionally-linked national economies, over vast sectors of every economy that are not internationally traded at all (70 percent of the U.S. economy, for example). On present trends, it will remain roughly this way for the rest of our lives. The world economy in the early 21st century is not even remotely borderless. Another stubborn reality is that, contrary to what some people seem to think, the nation-state is a long way from being economically irrelevant. Most fundamentally, it remains relevant to people because most people still live in the nation where they were born, which means that their economic fortunes depend upon wage and consumption levels within that one society. Unemployed Americans are learning this the hard way right now. Capital is a similar story. Even in the early 21st century, it hasn't been globalized nearly as much as often imagined. And it also cares very much about where it lives, frequently for the same reasons people do. (Few people wish to live or invest in Zimbabwe; many people wish to live and invest in California.) For a start, because 70 percent of America's capital is human capital, a lot of capital behaves exactly as people do, simply because it is people. Another 12 percent has been estimated by the World Bank to be social capital, the value of institutions and knowledge not assignable to individuals. So although liquid financial capital can indeed flash around the world in the blink of an electronic eye, this is only a fraction (under 10 percent) of any developed nation's capital stock. Even most nonhuman capital resides in things like real estate, infrastructure, physical plant, and types of financial capital that don't flow overseas -- or don't flow very much. (Economists call this "don't flow very much" phenomenon home bias, and it is well documented.) As a result, the output produced by all this capital is still largely tied to particular nations. So although capital mobility certainly causes big problems of its own, it is nowhere near big enough to literally abolish the nation-state as an economic unit. Will it do so one day? Even this is unlikely. Even where famously dematerializing and globalizing assets, like fiber optic telecom lines, are added -- assets that supposedly make physical location irrelevant--they are still largely being added where existing agglomerations of capital are. For example, although fiber optic backbones have gone into places like Bangalore, India, which were not global economic centers a generation ago, big increments of capacity have also gone into places like Manhattan, Tokyo, Silicon Valley, and Hong Kong, which were already important. As a result, existing geographic agglomerations of capital are largely self-reinforcing and here to stay, even if new ones come into being in unexpected places (often through decisions made by national governments). And these agglomerations have national shape because of past history; legacy effects can be extremely durable. Previous technological revolutions, such as the worldwide spread of railroads, were at least as big as current innovations like the Internet, and they didn't abolish the nation-state. Ironically, the enduring relevance of the national economy is clearest in some of the "poster child" countries of globalization, like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Ireland. In each of these nations, economic success was the product of policies enacted by governments that were in some sense nationalist. Japan industrialized after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to avoid being colonized by some Western power. Taiwan did it out of fear of mainland China. South Korea did it out of fear of North Korea. Ireland did it to escape economic domination by England. In each case, the driving force was not simply desire for profit. This exists in every society (including resource-rich basket cases like Nigeria, where it merely produces gangsterism), but does not reliably crystallize into the policies needed for economic growth. The driving force was national political needs that found a solution in economic development.

**Biotech is inevitable**

**Hinman 2008** (Lawrence M., University of San Diego, EthicsMatters, “The Clone Wars”, http://ethics.sandiego.edu/presentations/AppliedEthics/Stock-Fukuyama\_debate.pdf)

“Any serious attempt to block such research will simply increase the potential dangers of upcoming technologies by driving the work out of sight, blinding us to early indications of any medical or social problems.” Presupposes the Inevitability Argument Question: does Stock really believe that there are any medical or social problems associated with such research? Advances in biotechnology are inevitable • If banned in the United States, they will occur with less oversight in other countries—e.g., South Korea, Singapore, Eastern Europe • Isn’t it better to have them develop here with greater oversight?

**Biotech fails**

**Freese 8** (Bill Freese, International Monitor, OCA, “Biotech snake oil”, September-October 2008 http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article\_14755.cfm)

Most revealing, however, is what the biotech industry has engineered these crops for. Hype and promises of future innovations notwithstanding, there is not a single commercial GM crop with increased yield, drought-tolerance, salt-tolerance, enhanced nutrition or other attractive-sounding traits touted by the industry. Disease-resistant GM crops are practically non-existent. "We have yet to see genetically modified food that is cheaper, more nutritious or tastes better," says Hope Shand, research director for the Ontario-based ETC Group. "Biotech seeds have not been shown to be scientifically or socially useful." The industry's own figures reveal that GM crops incorporate one or both of just two "traits" - herbicide tolerance and insect resistance. Insect-resistant cotton and corn produce their own "built-in" insecticide to protect against certain, but far from all, insect pests. Herbicide-tolerant crops are engineered to withstand direct application of an herbicide to kill nearby weeds. These crops predominate, with 82 percent of global biotech crop acreage. Herbicide-tolerant crops (mainly soybeans) are popular with larger farmers because they simplify and reduce labor needs for weed control. They have thus helped facilitate the worldwide trend of consolidating farmland into fewer, ever bigger farms, like Argentina's huge soybean plantations. According to a 2004 study by Charles Benbrook, former executive director of the Board on Agriculture of the National Academy of Sciences, herbicide-tolerant crops have also led to a substantial increase in pesticide use. Benbrook's study found that adoption of herbicide-tolerant crops in the United States increased weed-killer use by 138 million pounds from 1996 to 2004 (while insect-resistant crops reduced insecticide use by just 16 million pounds over the same period). The vast majority of herbicide-tolerant crops are Monsanto's "Roundup Ready" varieties, tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate, which is sold under the brand-name Roundup. The dramatic rise in glyphosate use associated with Roundup Ready crops has spawned an epidemic of glyphosate-resistant weeds, just as bacteria evolve resistance to an overused antibiotic. Farmers respond to resistant weeds by upping the dose of glyphosate and by using greater quantities of other herbicides, such as the probable carcinogen 2,4-D (a component of Agent Orange) and the endocrine-disrupting weed killer atrazine, recently banned in the European Union. Glyphosate-resistant weeds and rising herbicide use are becoming serious problems in the United States, Argentina and Brazil. "Roundup continues to be the cornerstone of weed management for farms today and provides a lot of value to farmers," responds Darren Wallis, a Monsanto spokesperson. "We have some online tools to help farmers manage any weed control issues that they might have. There have been some documented cases of weed resistance, but Roundup continues to control hundreds of weeds very effectively." Critics retort that resistant weeds are spreading despite Monsanto's efforts, and that a technology often promoted as moving agriculture beyond the era of chemicals has in fact increased chemical dependency and accelerated the pesticide treadmill of industrial agriculture. And, of course, expensive inputs like herbicides (the price of glyphosate has doubled over the past year) are beyond the means of most poor farmers.

**Very low probability**

**Ayson 10** (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, 2010 Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld, nkj)

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?

More ev

**Ayson 10** (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, 2010 Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld, nkj)

It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.

**No motive—low odds of success deter and capabilities are underutilized**

**Moodie 2** – president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie, Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH15/DH15.htm)

The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an **understanding of mass casualty attacks as** both unnecessary and **counterproductive**. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins’ famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that “it’s not a matter of if but when.”

The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties— had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden’s constituency would appear to be not the “Arab street” or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal.

But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged—militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States—and much of the rest of the international community—to the annihilation of the perpetrators.

**No retaliation**

Sanger and Baker 10 – (David E. and [Peter](file:///C%3A%5CDocuments%20and%20Settings%5CMarcJacome%5CDesktop%5CGBS%20HJ%20Tub%5CSpace%20-%202011-2012%5CCase%20Negs%5CPeter), April, New York Times “Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms”. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06arms.html>)

WASHINGTON — [President Obama](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per) said Monday that he was revamping American nuclear strategy to substantially narrow the conditions under which the United States would use [nuclear weapons](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier), even in self defense. But the president said in an interview that he was carving out an exception for “outliers like Iran and North Korea” that have violated or renounced the main treaty to halt nuclear proliferation. Discussing his approach to nuclear security the day before formally releasing his new strategy, Mr. Obama described his policy as part of a broader effort to edge the world toward making nuclear weapons obsolete, and to create incentives for countries to give up any nuclear ambitions. To set an example, the new strategy renounces the development of any new nuclear weapons, overruling the initial position of his own defense secretary. Mr. Obama’s strategy is a sharp shift from those adopted by his predecessors and seeks to revamp the nation’s nuclear posture for a new age in which rogue states and terrorist organizations are greater threats than traditional powers like Russia and China. It eliminates much of the ambiguity that has deliberately existed in American nuclear policy since the opening days of the Cold War. For the first time, the United States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons, or launched a crippling cyberattack.

### Adv 2

**No Russian expansionism - not interested in conquering**

Doug **Bandow,** 1-2-20**12**; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; Op Ed: NATO and Libya: It’s Time To Retire a Fading Alliance http://feb17.info/editorials/op-ed-nato-and-libya-its-time-to-retire-a-fading-alliance/

The Cold War required an extraordinary defense commitment from the U.S. But no longer. Europe still matters, but it faces no genuine military threat. Whatever happens politically in Moscow, **there will be no Red Army pouring armored divisions through Germany’s Fulda Gap.** Washington has much to worry about, but Europe is not on the list. Of course, the Europeans still have geopolitical concerns. Civil wars in the Balkans and Libya threatened refugee flows and economic disruption. However, the Europeans are capable of handling such issues. Potentially more dangerous is the situation in Eastern Europe and beyond, most notably Georgia and Ukraine. But not dangerous to America. The U.S. has survived most of its history with these lands successively part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nor is there any evidence that Russia wants to forcibly reincorporate its “lost” territories into a renewed Soviet empire. Rather, Moscow appears to have retrogressed to a “great power” like Imperial Russia. The new Russia is concerned about international respect and border security. Threaten that, and war might result, as Georgia learned in 2008.

#### US checks Russia’s sphere of influence now

**Cooper and Kulish 09** (2/7/09, Helene Cooper and Nicholas Kulish, New York Times, “U.S. rejects 'sphere of influence' for Russia,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/europe/07iht-07munich.20001384.html)

But for all the talk of a new era in relations between the United States and the world, old sores remained, and with no sign of healing soon. For instance, while Biden's wording virtually echoed the stance on missile defense that Obama took during the presidential campaign, it was notable because Biden did not announce a strategic review of the issue, which administration officials had considered as a way to reduce tensions between Washington and Moscow. Instead, Biden hewed to a line long expressed by the Bush administration and said the Obama administration would pursue it "in consultation with our NATO allies and Russia." "We will not agree with Russia on everything," Biden said. "For example, the United States will not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. We will not recognize a sphere of influence. It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances." Biden said that the United States and Russia can disagree but should still look for ways to "work together where our interests coincide."

## 2nc

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### Russian collapse escalates all conflicts

Patrick, Speice 2006 J.D. Candidate 2006, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, Lexis

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. (49) Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. (50) In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. (51) This proliferation will **increase the risk of nuclear attacks** against the United States or its allies by hostile states, (52) as well as increase the likelihood that **regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons**. (53)

#### US-Russia nuclear war causes extinction and outweighs

Nick Bostrum March 2002 faculty of philosophy at Oxford and winner of the esteemed Eugene Gannon Award, <http://marukuwato.multiply.com/journal/item/157>

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Even if Russia doesn’t collapse, opportunistic aggression by China would escalate – causes extinction

AlexanderSharavin2001 Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally **be the only way out**, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

#### Russia is key to the global economy

#### --anchor for growth during recessions

Martin Gilman, 1-16-2008; Former senior representative of the IMF in Russia and professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. “Well-Placed to Weather an Economic Storm,” Moscow Times, <http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2008/01/16/008.html>

Faced with this gloomy global outlook, Russia is well placed to weather the storm. In fact, not only is the Russian economy **likely to decouple largely from a sagging U**nited **S**tates and even Europe, but its continuing boom -- mostly but not solely **fueled by high energy revenues** -- **is** sucking in both consumer and investment goods, and so **acting as a motor of world growth**. And the planned $1 trillion public investment program over the next decade should ensure that the country remains decoupled for years to come.

#### --key leader of emerging economies

Martin Delaney 1-26-2011**;**, “Russia: The Wild East,” Investment And Pensions Europe)

However, many would argue they are wrong. "There are important reforms going on in Russia at the moment," explains Vladimir Kirillov, chief executive of TKB BNP Paribas Investment Partners. "You are seeing a reform of the social security system, ongoing reform in the pension system and a significant decrease in the burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises." Beyond the reform programme the fundamentals remain sound - despite the ongoing fall-out from the global economic crisis. According to Franklin Templeton Investm ents' latest Market Perspectives note, while the Russian economy contracted by 7.9% in 2009, it is forecast to grow by 4% in 2010 - and 4.3% in 2011. By the end of September 2010 Russian equities had more than doubled since they bottomed in January 2009. For October alone, the Russian equity market reported a rise of 5.7%. The Russian economy continues to stabilise, with unemployment falling substantially since the beginning of the year and retail sales and disposable income have increasing. The oil price remains relatively buoyant at just below $85 per barrel - well above the oft-cited $55-$60 range that Russia needs for its economy to break even. "This means that the Russian government will be able to run lower budget deficits this year and next, which in turn should mitigate inflationary pressure and prove supportive for the ruble as it will limit the rate of money supply growth," notes Michael Kart, managing partner at Marshall Spectrum, the Moscow-based emerging markets equity manager specialising in Russia and CIS. Concerns remain about the impact of the recent drought and wildfires, particularly on the agricultural sector, but the general trend of the markets and the economy is upwards. As the western markets falter, those in the emerging markets will continue to be the "the **engine** spurring the **world's growth** over the next years", explains Kart. "Russia as the world's main storehouse of raw materials will provide the necessary fuel for that. If we take a look at the country within the BRIC context, we would notice that the country has by far more natural resources, a more educated population, a higher proportion of the middle-class, a strong macroeconomic framework, a better track record - and it is cheaper." And this is the key: on virtually any metric Russia offers potentially better opportunities than most other emerging markets. Kart remains convinced the country offers investors a multitude of opportunities. "Contrary to popular belief, Russia, according to various studies performed by institutions such as World Bank and the IMF, compares well with its peers on metrics like ease of doing business, market size, transparency, infrastructure, penetration, dividend yield, and return on equity," he insists. That is a bold statement to make, but one echoed by fund managers and investment analysts based in Moscow. "The people who are able to identify and manage the risks should be able to benefit from the low multiples when the overall perception of Russia improves," says Dimitri Kryukov, founder and CIO of Verno Investment Management, which runs the Verno Russia fund. "Russia looks particularly interesting as it is one of the cheapest major markets in the world, supported by broad-based GDP and EPS growth, sound macro fundamentals and relatively high commodity prices," agrees Marcus Svedberg, chief economist at East Capital. "Russian WTO membership, which seems more realistic than ever, would be a positive trigger that is not yet priced in by the market. A steady stream of IPOs absorbed liquidity and Russia has underperformed other emerging markets in 2010 and is still 40% below its pre-crisis peak. We believe this is a good entry point." Matthias Siller, co-manager of the Baring Russia fund, says that one can find opportunities to make money work harder than in other places as long as you are there on the ground. "The finance and consumer-related sectors offer much higher returns on capital than you would find in other markets in Europe - and that has never been more pronounced than now," he says. "These sectors in Russia will only get bigger." The emergent middle class and an ancillary increase in consumer demand are fuelling an unparalleled period of expansion. And, in spite of rumbling concerns about its relations with its neighbours, Russia's government remains relatively stable. Expected presidential elections in 2012 are likely to see a smooth handover of power - although doubts grow as to whether Putin will be able to reclaim the top job. "Russia's political risk is different [to that of other emerging markets]," explains Hugo Bain, senior investment manager of the Pictet Russian Equities fund. "For example, in Turkey the political risk is top-down, but in Russia it is more focused at the company and sector level. Clearly there is political involvement in certain sectors and companies, and sometimes that does make investing in Russia quite opaque. You learn to live with it." Yet in spite of a general consensus that Russia offers one of the investment opportunities of the decade, there remain good reasons why valuations are so low. Claude Tiramani, manager of Lutetia Capital's Emerging Opportunities fund, points out that infrastructure spending as a percentage of GDP has declined from 40% in the 1970s to just 20% today. The dependence of the economy on the oil and gas sectors is also a worry (see further article in this section) - although the government is making a concerted effort to diversify its tax revenues. Moves to establish a broader economy have led to investments into agriculture and the development of the banking sector. Concerns around corporate governance and corruption are valid - exemplified by the Yukos affair. In its 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International, the anti-corruption group, ranked Russia at 2.1 on a scale of 1-10 where 10 represents "very clean". The other BRIC nations, China, India and Brazil, all scored 3.5, 3.3 and 3.7 respectively. By way of comparison, the US and the UK scored 7.1 and 7.6 respectively. The owner of the UK's Independent and Evening Standard newspapers, Alexander Lebedev, whose Moscow investment bank was recently raided by secret service agents, recently claimed Russians pay $300bn a year in bribes - almost a quarter of the country's GDP. He has categorically denied any wrongdoing himself. Ultimately, however, many of those based in Moscow say they read about a country in the press that they simply do not recognise. "I don't want to sound like an apologist, but Russia does receive a biased press," argues David Thornton, fund manager of the Matrix New Europe fund. "They have a complete blind spot in their reporting of Russia." Even investors into Yukos could still have made money - despite the state's tax levy. "From the first signs of trouble in July 2003," explains Dimitri Kryukov at the Verno Russia fund, "Yukos still managed to post a high in April 2004 - nine months after the trouble first emerged. Investors who had done their homework would still have been able to protect their capital." In essence, his comments represent a good first lesson for investors seeking opportunities in Russia: with an understanding of the situation and insight into the risks posed by the BRIC nation, the country offers superlative investment returns. Russia may be viewed as the wild east of the BRIC nations, but now is the time that the great fortunes of the future are being made.

### A2 u

#### Prices high for 2013 – positive economic indicators and fundamentals

The Guardian 12-30-2012; Oil prices record biggest weekly gain since August http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=109103:oil-prices-record-biggest-weekly-gain-since-august&catid=31:business&Itemid=562

CRUDE oil prices headed for the biggest weekly gain since September in New York as U.S. lawmakers scheduled talks aimed at averting automatic tax increases and spending cuts that threaten the economy of the world’s largest consumer. Brent for February settlement on the London-based ICE Futures Europe Exchange increased as much as 58 cents, or 0.5 per cent, to $111.38 a barrel. The volume was 50 per cent less than the 100-day average. It was at a premium of $19.62 to WTI, down from $19.93 on Thursday, the narrowest closing spread in almost 10 weeks. West Texas Intermediate climbed as much as 0.7 per cent, extending this week’s advance to 2.7 per cent. Congressional leaders plan to meet with President Barack Obama on Friday, seeking to resolve a budget impasse before at least $600 billion in fiscal measures take effect on January 1. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor announced the chamber will meet December 30 for its first Sunday session in more than two years. U.S. stockpiles shrank last week, an industry report showed on Thursday. “Prices could jump if U.S. politicians strike a deal on avoiding the fiscal cliff,” said Michael Poulsen, an analyst at Global Risk Management Limited in Middelfart, Denmark, who predicts Brent, the benchmark grade for half the world’s oil, will be little changed in the first quarter, averaging $112 a barrel. “If no deal is struck, prices are likely to trade sideways at current levels.”

### A2 Energy Independence

#### DoE estimates indicate there’s not enough oil for independence, let alone abundance

Oceana citing DOE 2012; “The Three Myths Of Offshore Drilling” <http://oceana.org/en/our-work/climate-energy/offshore-drilling/learn-act/the-three-myths-of-offshore-drilling>

The only way to become truly energy independent is to end our addiction to oil. The DOE estimates that even if we opened all offshore areas to drilling, the U.S. would still rely on imports for about 58% of its oil supply. The United States **simply does not have enough domestic oil** to truly reduce its dependence on imports, much less to fulfill its demand. The best way to eliminate foreign oil dependence is to eliminate dependence on oil altogether by developing alternative sources, rapidly switching to plug-in and electric vehicles and phasing out oil consumption in other portions of our economy like home heating and electricity generation. For more information on how the U.S. can phase out the need for oil, see Oceana's report Breaking the Habit.

### XT No Energy Abundance

#### You are goddamned crazy

SACE 2010; Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, “Myth-Busters: The Tale of Misinformation” http://www.cleanenergy.org/index.php?/Learn-About-Details.html?form\_id=52&item\_id=92

There are numerous misnomers about offshore oil drilling, many of which are perpetuated by the industry as reasons why we have to continue risky extraction practices rather than turning our sights to safer, cleaner, more sustainable energy sources. Here are 3 typical drilling Myths. MYTH: Drilling for oil will lead us to energy independence - we need MORE oil! FACT: Drilling will NOT lead to energy independence. Based on current consumption rates (20 million bbo/day), even if we were to recover all of the "technically recoverable" oil in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico and along our Atlantic shoreline, it would only last the US 13 months. We could drill every national park, wildlife refuge, and coastline, and still need to import over 60% of what we would need. U.S. oil is only a drop in the bucket. MYTH: The U.S. provides most of its own oil. FACT: The U.S. does not provide most of its own oil, and the oil we do produce makes up a small part of both our supply and demand. The U.S. imports approximately 66% of its oil needs from both allies and hostile political regimes. The other 34% comes from domestic crude oil production, which means the U.S. imports approximately two-thirds of our oil needs each day. Domestic offshore drilling only generates 9% of the total amount of oil Americans consume.

### Links / U – regulatory certainty

#### Arguments about ramped up US oil production are media hype- increased investment hasn’t happened yet

**Richardson, 12** (John, “US Oil: Nothing Is Uncertain As Certainty” Asian Chemical Connections, 11/14,

<http://www.icis.com/blogs/asian-chemical-connections/2012/11/us-oil-nothing-is-uncertain-as.html>)

ALL of yesterday's excitement about the US overtaking Saudi Arabia and Russia by 2017 to become the world's biggest oil producer - and exceeding Russia to become the world's biggest gas producer by 2015 - needs to be taken with a very large pinch of salt.

The release of the International Energy Agency (IEA) report, which made the above predictions, made fantastic headlines. But, as Fatih Birhol, the IEA's chief economist concedes, the geology of shale and tight oil and gas in the US is "poorly known".

#### The US has the potential to be the largest oil exporter – but it requires new investment to realize it

**Mills, 12 -** physicist, is an adjunct fellow with the Manhattan Institute and Forbes Energy Intelligence columnist. He served in President Ronald Reagan’s White House Science Office (Politico, “U.S. can become an energy export nation” 7/25, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78978.html>)

Imagine a future in which the United States abandons its tepid policy of inching toward energy “independence” and instead joins forces with Canada and Mexico to become the world’s largest energy exporter.

It could push the Middle East off the geopolitical center stage. Americans would profit from supplying the world energy instead of spending to defend those supplies. The North American energy industry would also bring trillions of dollars in domestic economic benefits and generate millions of jobs.

This felicitous scenario is now possible because the energy world has been turned upside-down. While policymakers globally have focused on alternatives to hydrocarbons, from solar and wind to plant matter, the game-changing technologies that have emerged are in the traditional sectors — unleashing staggering quantities of natural gas, oil and coal.

We have the potential to become the world’s swing supplier of energy. For the U.S. economy and its North American neighbors, Mexico and Canada, the reality is nothing short of revolutionary.

The timing of this technological juggernaut is fortuitous. Titanic demographic forces are in play. The Asia-Pacific tigers are projected to increase global energy demand 40 percent to 50 percent by 2030, according to every credible forecast — from our own Department of Energy to the International Energy Agency. It’s like adding two United States’ worth of consumption in less than two decades.

The same forecasters acknowledge that at least 60 percent to 80 percent of that energy must come from hydrocarbons. The economic imperatives and the physics of energy dictate this.

Policymakers from Spain to China, and Germany to the U.S., have spent decades pursuing the dual goal of replacing hydrocarbons with alternative energy and revitalizing their economies with green jobs. It hasn’t panned out. The favored alternatives — including wind and solar — barely exceed 1 percent of global energy today, most likely rising to just 5 percent in 20 years.

There have indeed been real technology gains in alternatives. But many analysts act as if the hydrocarbon industries operate in a parallel universe — where two decades of profound advances in information and materials sciences never took place. For it’s with hydrocarbons that new technologies have been transformative.

With these advances, the U.S. has emerged as the world’s fastest-growing producer of oil and natural gas. Production growth these past few years has reversed a 40-year decline. All this has happened in an environment either hostile to or, at best, neutral toward hydrocarbons.

In hydrocarbon-friendly states, tax coffers are bulging and job markets are booming, largely from production on private and state-controlled lands. Ohio alone stands to reap 200,000 new jobs by 2015 and $22 billion in economic growth. In the Western states, a mere few dozen proposed oil and gas projects could generate 120,000 jobs and $400 billion cumulative benefits over 15 years.

If there’s a smart-money bellwether, consider Carlyle Group’s latest bet — buying and refurbishing Sunoco’s Philadelphia oil refinery. Refined petroleum product exports are growing rapidly and are highly profitable.

A number of recent detailed forecasts predict that the U.S. could close in on zero imports if current trends continue. We could finally realize that elusive goal of energy “independence.” In the process, we could add nearly $1 trillion in cumulative federal, state and local government tax revenues and generate 2 to 4 million new jobs.

But independence misses the point in a world craving fuel. We need to become an exporter. The U.S. could, in collaboration with Canada and Mexico similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement, forge policies to encourage hydrocarbon production and export.

That would reset geopolitics. And just starting down that path would really light a fire under job and economic growth.

We know sufficient geophysical resources exist to support an export-nation policy. U.S. Geological Survey data reveal that this continent has more than 10,000 billion barrels of oil-equivalent in natural gas, oil and coal. That’s more than four times the resources of the Middle East. We consume only 20 billion of that a year.

If we maximized North American hydrocarbon potential, our energy exports to the world could exceed those from the Middle East by 2030. This would add something like $7 trillion to our economies, spur manufacturing as well as research and development investment from the largesse and stimulate millions more high-paying jobs. And it would send tremors through the fields of the Middle East and Russia.

The key to converting resources to producible “reserves” for export lies in advancing technology. We might even embrace the shocking idea of subsidizing this. But we cannot be an export nation without moving beyond a ball-and-chain regulatory system — including access to the vast swaths of resources under off-limits federal lands.

There is no doubt the world will use vastly more hydrocarbons in the future. The only real variables are who will supply all that fuel — and thus who will enjoy the economic and geopolitical benefits.

We have the potential to be that leader. If we don’t grab that chance, others will.

Expanding North American hydrocarbon production for export may be our most important opportunity for growth — as well as for long-term peace.

#### Removing restrictions is vital to sustaining US oil investment – regulatory certainty is vital to realizing the benefits of new energy production by creating a framework to drive infrastructure investment

**Verrastro, 12** - director of the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and international Studies (Frank, CNN, “Energy policy: What we need to talk about”, 10/17

<http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/17/energy-policy-what-we-need-to-talk-about/>)

As the political rhetoric surrounding U.S. energy “independence” heats up, it is worth pointing out a few things to help provide much needed context. After all, there are plenty of things at play here in the coming months and years – resource access and regulatory policy, fuels choices, infrastructure build out, industrial policy, imports and exports, tax and investment decisions, the role of nuclear, subsidies for alternatives, efficiency priorities, SPR policy, environmental concerns and the use of energy as a geopolitical or foreign policy tool. Whew!

For starters, the United States is already over 80 percent (up from 70 percent a decade ago) self sufficient when it comes to energy production and use. We are routinely described as the Saudi Arabia of coal, and have the largest nuclear fleet in the world. We are the world’s largest natural gas producer and the 3rd largest oil producer. Renewables account for roughly 10 percent of our energy mix and we have in place a variety of efficiency standards, mandates and incentive programs. That said, our transportation fleet is more than 94 percent dependent on liquid fuels, mostly petroleum based, and as oil is a globally traded commodity, changes in worldwide supply and demand consequently impact U.S. consumer prices.

In an attempt to limit that impact, we have routinely looked to conservation, fuel switching and CAFÉ standards to alter the demand curve; and to incentives, access, technology improvements, alternative fuels and higher prices to stimulate additional supplies. In times of crises, we have utilized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to infuse the system with additional incremental oil supply. At the time of writing, largely as a result of the unconventional (shale gas and tight oil) revolution, U.S oil production is at its highest level in decades. Natural gas has eclipsed the previous output record set back in 1973. Oil imports comprise less than 46 percent (down from 60 percent) of total consumption, and refined product exports are averaging almost 3 million barrels per day, giving our refining sector an enormous “value add.” Projections indicate that we will be a net exporter of natural gas (and possibly oil) in the not too distant future.

Last year, fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) accounted for roughly 80 percent of global energy consumption. Renewables, including nuclear, made up the rest. And while the growth in solar and wind has been enormous, the base remains small and intermittency and infrastructure challenges remain large. Yet, in the wake of Macondo, Fukushima and the shale gas and tight oil revolutions, the energy landscape is rapidly changing. Higher prices and technology applications at scale are producing a revolution of their own – namely in the ability to access huge unconventional oil and gas resources both here and abroad.

And this phenomenon is creating a new American energy reality, allowing the nation to increasingly become more energy self-sufficient, achieve a significant reduction in our imports/balance of payments, and concurrently create an engine for economic growth, a platform for technology and innovation, job creation, new tax and royalty revenues, and the revitalization of domestic industries.

But realizing this vision requires that policymakers successfully tackle a number of complex issues. Here are what I believe are the most important:

Resource access & development policy: The U.S. is resource-rich when it comes to energy forms, so the issue here is how much do we make available for development, at what price, over what period and under what type of regulatory regime? Outside of the central and western Gulf of Mexico, much of America’s offshore oil and gas resources are presently off limits, although there are plans being worked on to develop offshore wind energy systems. Federal lands require (by statute) a number of alternative use and conservation/preservation considerations and we are now only beginning to consider scalable Arctic development, including lands in Alaska. Environmental policy to preserve and protect lands, species, water, air and safety requirement for developers are also critical considerations. Prudently weighing trade offs are key challenges for policymakers.

Onshore, in the lower 48 states, issues surrounding well integrity, hydraulic fracturing, water use, treatment, recycling and disposal of waste water, community impacts, emissions and other environmental and safety concerns are currently the focus of both state and federal regulators and will need to be resolved collaboratively with producer/operators and other stakeholders to allow the large scale development of our enormous unconventional resources.

Infrastructure build out: This is a key consideration for realizing the benefits of the current boom in unconventional oil and gas development. Crude oil needs to get to refiners and natural gas to utilities, industrial customers, processors and other end users. That requires pipeline interconnects and new midstream infrastructure and involves permits, environmental assessments and managing “above ground” impacts of local communities through which pipes and railways travel. As investments here are bound to be enormous, regulatory certainty and confidence in a timely and predictable permitting process (while allowing for public input) are critical as lead times are significant and failure to construct key infrastructure leads to bottlenecks and stranded resources.

#### The plan dramatically escalates production levels – that shatters OPEC

Daniel Gallington 12-24-2012; Senior Policy and Program Adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute in Arlington, Va. He served in senior national security policy positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Justice, and as bipartisan general counsel for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “How Fracking Could Affect U.S. Policy Towards the Middle East” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/24/fracking-opec-and-violence-in-the-middle-east?s\_cid=rss:world-report:fracking-opec-and-violence-in-the-middle-east

In the news a lot recently is "fracking," the shorthand for "fracturing". It's an oil-drilling technique that's becoming increasingly effective for recovering lots of oil and gas from rock formations—and is undergoing widening application in the United States. In fact, a recent public report by the National Intelligence Council says that modern fracking for oil in the United States is a "technological revolution, which won't be completely understood for some time." And that "in a tectonic shift, energy independence is not unrealistic for the US in as short a period as 10-20 years." [See a collection of political cartoons on energy policy.] Perhaps even more important, the report observes that: A dramatic expansion of US production could also push global spare capacity to exceed 8 million barrels per day, at which point OPEC could lose price control **and crude oil prices would drop, possibly sharply**. Such a drop would take a **heavy toll on many energy producers** who are increasingly dependent on relatively high energy prices to balance their budgets.

#### More spare capacity shatters OPEC’s price controls and causes spirals of declining prices

Daniel Gallington 12-24-2012; Senior Policy and Program Adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute in Arlington, Va. He served in senior national security policy positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Justice, and as bipartisan general counsel for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “How Fracking Could Affect U.S. Policy Towards the Middle East” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/24/fracking-opec-and-violence-in-the-middle-east?s\_cid=rss:world-report:fracking-opec-and-violence-in-the-middle-east

In sum, the real answer to high oil energy prices is very, very simple and always has been simple: **Lots and lots of "product"—the more the better**—and "product" that's "fungible" enough so that classic Keynesian economic models can legitimately apply to world oil pricing, thereby breaking OPEC's cartel. It also goes—almost without saying—that if oil prices were determined this way, instead of by OPEC, they would be a lot lower!

### Link – nat gas

#### Natural gas production and price declines causes lower trading on oil futures and tanks prices

Robert Weinstein 6-12-2012; mentors traders, and writes several weekly columns in Rocco Pendola's Option Investing newsletter 30 years of studying and investing experience, “Natural Gas Will Dictate Oil Prices, Not Iranian Sanctions or OPEC”; http://www.thestreet.com/story/11576837/3/natural-gas-will-dictate-oil-prices-not-iranian-sanctions-or-opec.html

Natural Gas As oil prices move toward and below $75, natural gas prices will still remain very cheap relative to diesel and gas. Diesel and gas refinery operations, currently in high demand are keeping a greater share of the crack spread, keeping prices at the pump from falling. Refining limitations will distort the correlation between oil prices and pump prices, while natural gas continues to demonstrate price superiority. Natural gas production in North America gas tracked with United States Natural Gas ETF (UNG) is part of the reason long-dated oil futures are trading at a discount relative to shorter term contracts. With so much energy available and natural gas at prices comparable to about half the cost of gasoline and diesel, it's just a matter of time before real meaningful conversion takes place. There are companies dedicated to producing engines and infrastructure to make natural gas refueling stations as common as diesel is today. Clean Energy(CLNE) has operations in refueling stations, systems, and vehicle conversion technology. Cummins(CMI) and Westport's(WPRT) joint venture "Cummins Westport" builds the engines for long haul truck operators and others to use natural gas instead of diesel. Cummins Westport is not alone; both Ford Motor(F) and General Motors(GM) are producing vehicles capable of using natural gas as their fuel. It's Ford and General Motors vehicles that really make the case for falling future gas prices. As companies like Clean Energy produce increasingly more public refueling stations (about half are public), Ford and General Motors will have an easier time marketing vehicles tied to natural gas. The major automakers are not able to turn on a dime to produce natural gas vehicles and even if they could, there is a refueling location issue (Clean Energy is working full speed along with other smaller companies to solve this issue), but they don't need to start selling the vehicles yet. As long as the wheels are in motion (which they are) oil prices have little reason beyond temporary catalysts to trade higher. **The forward-looking nature of the stock market** has impacted more companies as well. (Read why I believe gold is well on its way back to $1,200 an ounce.) As **the cost of energy falls**, just about every product in the market will have deflationary pressure. Take a box of macaroni and cheese, for example. The actual food product cost is 30% of the cost of energy into putting the box of food on a grocer's shelf. Lower energy costs equal greater spending by consumers, in turn lifting corporate profits and lifting the SPY. Natural gas will also allow Ford and General Motors to produce lower emissions and cost to operate vehicles. Expect consumers, the overall market, auto makers and natural gas producers to win and high-cost oil producers to struggle.

### Econ

**Resilience makes the impact impossible**

**Zakaria 2009** – PhD in political science from Harvard, editor of Newsweek International, former managing editor of Foreign Affairs (12/12, Fareed, Newsweek, “The Secrets of Stability”, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2, WEA)

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.

Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."

Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.

Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.

One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.

A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"

This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.

It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.

Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today.

Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong.

This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West.

The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from -hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability.

Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity. Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system.

Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world.

This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

### A2 retal

**Public anxiety prevents retaliation—prefer our peer reviewed study over their assertions about 9/11**

**Huddy et al 2005** – associate professor of political science, Stony Brook University (Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav, American Journal of Political Science, Volume 49 No. 3, “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies”, pages 605-6, EBSCO, WEA)

The findings from this study lend further insight into the future trajectory of support for antiterrorism measures in the United States when we consider the potential effects of anxiety. Security threats in this and other studies increase support for military action (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998;Herrmann,Tetlock, and Visser 1999). But anxious respondents were less supportive of belligerent military action against terrorists, suggesting an important source of opposition to military intervention. In the aftermath of 9/11, several factors were consistently related to heightened levels of anxiety and related psychological reactions, including living close to the attack sites (Galea et al. 2002; Piotrkowski and Brannen 2002; Silver et al. 2002), and knowing someone who was hurt or killed in the attacks (in this study). It is difficult to say what might happen if the United States were attacked again in the near future. Based onour results, it is plausible that a future threat or actual attack directed at a different geographic region would broaden the number of individuals directly affected by terrorism and concomitantly raise levels of anxiety. This could, in turn, lower support for overseas military action. In contrast, in the absence of any additional attacks levels of anxiety are likely to decline slowly over time (we observed a slow decline in this study), weakening opposition to future overseas military action.

Since our conclusions are based on analysis of reactions to a single event in a country that has rarely felt the effects of foreign terrorism, we should consider whether they can be generalized to reactions to other terrorist incidents or to reactions under conditions of sustained terrorist action. Our answer is a tentative yes, although there is no conclusive evidence on this point as yet. Some of our findings corroborate evidence from Israel, a country that has prolonged experience with terrorism. For example, Israeli researchers find that perceived risk leads to increased vilification of a threatening group and support for belligerent action (Arian 1989; Bar-Tal and Labin 2001). There is also evidence that Israelis experienced fear during the Gulf War, especially in Tel Aviv where scud missiles were aimed (Arian and Gordon 1993). What is missing, however, is any evidence that anxiety tends to undercut support for belligerent antiterrorism measures under conditions of sustained threat. For the most part, Israeli research has not examined the distinct political effects of anxiety.

In conclusion, the findings from this study provide significant new evidence on the political effects of terrorism and psychological reactions to external threat more generally. Many terrorism researchers have speculated that acts of terrorist violence can arouse fear and anxiety in a targeted population, which lead to alienation and social and political dislocation.8 We have clear evidence that the September 11 attacks did induce anxiety in a sizeable minority of Americans. And these emotions were strongly associated with symptoms of depression, appeared to inhibit learning about world events, **and weakened support for overseas military action**. This contrasted, however, with Americans’ dominant reaction, which was a heightened concern about future terrorist attacks in the United States that galvanized support for government antiterrorist policy. In this sense, the 9/11 terrorists failed to arouse sufficient levels of anxiety to counteract Americans’ basic desire to strike back in order to increase future national security, even if such action increased the shortterm risk of terrorism at home. Possible future acts of terrorism, or a different enemy, however, could change the fine balance between a public attuned to future risks and one dominated by anxiety.

**They assume mass hysteria—that assumption is false**

**Kindt 2006** (Michael, Deputy Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center, and adjunct professor at the Air War College, “Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned Lessons from Military and Civilian Experience,” November, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A461497&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

This understanding of resilience and how it can be enhanced is particularly important in light of current knowledge regarding human behavior in the face of threat or disaster. Recent work by Anthony Mawson highlights the marked disparity between how people are presumed to behave during disasters and their actual behavior. He finds that in contrast to the prevailing belief that in the face of disaster there will be mass panic and/or violence as people recklessly flee to safety, there is little evidence to support this belief. Mawson finds that rather than panicking and fleeing, research suggests that people are much more likely to engage in activities that are supportive of others or involve seeking familiar people or places. He cites four mistaken assumptions that contribute to the belief that panic is likely in disaster situation. First, that the drive for self-preservation will result in fleeing the scene or fighting others. Second, individuals will choose to move toward a safe location. Third, physical dangers will create more panic than other types of stress. Fourth, panic is only prevented by strict social discipline and leadership.10 These mistaken assumptions can lead those in positions of responsibility and authority to attempt to avert such panic by not releasing information about a potential disaster or attack. This behavior could potentially make panic more likely when a disaster does occur.11

**And, nuclear forensics prevent US response**

**Erwin and Manguson 2009** - managing editor of National Defense Magazine (Sandra and Stew, National Defense Magazine, "7 deadly myths about weapons of terror", http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2009/JUNE/Pages/7Deadly.aspx?PF=1, WEA)

**Myth** #4: If the U.S. Were the Victim of a Nuclear Attack, It Would Immediately Retaliate

Under the nightmare scenario of a nuclear bomb exploding in a U.S. city, the implied assumption is that the nation’s leaders would immediately be able to fire back.

That would be the case under the Cold War rules of nuclear retaliation, but the situation is far more complicated when nuclear attacks are perpetrated by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. Unless the weapon is delivered by a missile, immediate retaliation is not realistic, experts said. It could take weeks or months to figure out where the nuclear materials came from or how the explosive device was built.

No state or terrorist group would choose to launch a nuclear weapon by missile because we would know the origin, said Evan Montgomery, of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The more likely means to execute a nuclear attack would be to smuggle the materials and build the bomb on U.S. soil, or steal a bomb and somehow manage to bring it into the United States. Either way, U.S. nuclear experts may not be able to quickly determine the origin of the weapon once it’s detonated.

Forensics can take weeks or months, said Charles Blair, director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies and co-author of a recently published book titled, “Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

“None of the systems we have now are very quick,” he said. “Government officials and the public would have to be willing to wait a while before we retaliate.”

Nuclear forensics usually is based on fallout and debris. Within hours, U.S. authorities could determine that it was a nuclear explosion. It would take up to a couple of days to determine if there was uranium, plutonium or a mix of the two in the weapon. It’s known that eight nations have plutonium bombs, and six others have enough plutonium to build a bomb. If there were a nuclear explosion of a plutonium based weapon, it could be traced to one of 14 countries.

With uranium-based weapons, it’s more complicated. There are 40 countries that have enough uranium to build at least one bomb. That would take longer to track, said Blair. “You can take debris samples and compare them against known tests. You can within several weeks trace the design to known designs.”

Nuclear forensics would be far easier if there were a single global database that listed all known methods of creating uranium or plutonium, and catalogued the weapon designs, Blair said. But such a database is unlikely to ever materialize.

States prefer to not reveal information about the fissile materials they use or their methods for constructing a weapon. The world’s largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, both go to great lengths to protect their top secret data on the isotopic composition of their weapons grade plutonium.

## 1nr

### AT: Ag

#### Crop yields now

Zumbrun ‘8 [Josh. Staffer for Forbes. “Getting Down With the Farm” 9/3/8. Forbes, ln//khirn]

The high-decibel message: Agriculture has arrived. It's an unprecedented time of power and importance for the industry in the nation's capital. All these companies and organizations are quick to point out that, while all part of the broad agriculture tapestry, they're not exactly natural allies. When fertilizer prices go up, the farmers take a hit; when commodity prices go up, the processors take a hit; when fuel prices go up, everyone takes a hit (except, perhaps, ethanol). But underneath the industry's dozens of competing interests is one overarching theme--trade--and a question: Which presidential candidate best helps their interests? Long something of an afterthought, an over-subsidized laggard during the infotech boom, agriculture is now a burgeoning bright spot in a largely troubled economy. While government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are teetering on the edge of nationalization, the Farm Credit System, a forgotten government-sponsored enterprise, is buzzing along. Gone are the days where debt from Fannie and Freddie was second only to U.S. Treasuries. Today, spreads are lower in the farm credit system, a testament to the surging strength of agriculture, says AgStar Financial President Paul DeBriyn and a member of the board of directors for Farmer Mac. And with long-standing subsidies secured by passage of the 2008 farm bill earlier this year, industry leaders in Minneapolis were free to focus on open markets for a new generation of products. Technology is rapidly changing the interests of the industry. John Johnson, the chief executive of CHS, a major agriculture co-op, explains the industry's new fundamentals. Improvements in seeds and farming practices allowed corn yields to double in 15 years. As crops get more bug-resistant and drought-resistant and can grow in more tightly planted rows, that number could double again in the next couple of decades. In the past, there's been little incentive to develop this new lab-grown abundance. Demand in the U.S. grows mostly in step with the population, which hardly grows at all. This led to the industry taking a bad rap for overproduction--for stuffing calories into Twinkies or letting crops rot in silos. Now, rising global demand, for food and fuels, changes the equation. Increasing production is needed to feed the world's masses--and gas tanks. The producers of genetically modified seeds are going from Dr. FrankenFoods to the potential saviors of the global hungry.”

### AT: Airpower

#### Airpower fails – doesn’t deter conflict

**Clodfelter 6** (Mark, professor of military history at the National War College, “The limits of air power: the American bombing of North Vietnam”, Google Books, Page xi, AV)

Unfortunately, precision bombing may not be the answer. Despite being several technological generations ahead of the capability displayed in Vietnam, smart munitions still do not guarantee zero collateral damage. Many of the precision air attacks against insurgent leaders have produced claims by insurgents—as well as by Iraqis who do not support the insurgency—that Iraqi civilians have been killed in the raids. Whether true or not, such accusations grab headlines in the Islamic press and on Al Jazeera, providing the perception among many in the Muslim world that such attacks display a callous disregard for Muslim civilian lives. In the type of war that America now faces, those perceptions have become reality to many opposing the United States. In such conflicts, even with such advantages as Predator drones and Hellfire missiles, the long-term harm of applying lethal air power is likely to eclipse its short-term benefit. As long as negative political goals remain substantial, the limits of air power displayed in Vietnam will continue to restrict its utility in the twenty-first century.

### Neolib K

#### And, neoliberalism devalues the meaning of life – individuals become nothing more than cogs in a growth machine, were pleasure becomes subservient to profit and you are protected only insofar as you are cost-effective.

Jerry D. **Rose**, a retired sociology professor from State University of New York, “How Neo-Liberalism Has Created The World's Immigration Crisis,” 2/12/**2008**, http://www.countercurrents.org/rose120208.htm

Well, how about we start with recognizing what may be the crux of the matter: that the U.S. and the rest of the world is caught in a trap of "neo-liberal" globalization which has made corporate profit the be and end-all of public policy. Under the inspiration of this philosophy, the world economy is re-made as a global playground of profit-seeking for its corporate entrepreneurs, with "privatized" societies which **render each individual an atom of existence to be manipulated for corporate profit at the expense of the pleasures and supports of the social commons.** These "atoms," cut loose from the bonds of family and community, are not only free but compelled for their own survival to move from their ancestral homelands to other places where they have a chance of survival. Given that the more "developed" countries offer employment opportunities that are marginally better than those available to people in the "under-developed" ones, the immigration flow is predominantly from under-developed to developed ones, as from Latin Americans to the U.S. and Canada, Africans and Asians to "old" countries of western Europe.

#### Economic exploitation is the root cause of war.

William Eckhardt, Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, Journal of Peace Research, February 1990, p. 15-16

Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: ‘[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars’ (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this process of benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence: ‘World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence’ (pp. 965, 969). ‘The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all’ (p. 1190). This ‘disparity between states’, not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed **15-20 times as many people** in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of ‘disparity between states’ created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that ‘Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase’ (pp. 246, 247). So far as structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright’s estimate was very conservative indeed. Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused ‘only’ 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one’s benefit, but of putting **an end to life itself!** This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It’s too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. **Life itself may depend upon our choice.**

### AT: Perm

#### All of their evidence is game-playing to make oil companies appear to hold more assets- they won’t drill in the OCS

Karlamangla 8-14

Soumya, writer for The Nation, “The Top 5 Myths About the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act”

House Republicans have consistently used the term “job creation” as a smokescreen for increasing oil production while trying to sell the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act. When the bill was first introduced to the House it was called the “Strategic Energy Production Act,” and there was no mention of jobs at all. These legislators argue that an increase in drilling on federal land will create jobs. But as California Democrat John Garamendi pointed out, job creation is merely a possible, and unlikely, byproduct of bills that are actually focused on putting more land in the hands of oil companies. Representative **Garamendi** explained on the House floor that acquiring land is a financial game for oil companies to make it appear like they have more assets. In March 2011, there were 38 million acres of land under lease for drilling, but 22 million of those acres were inactive, meaning more than half was unused. A similar 70 percent of offshore acres were also inactive. These companies aren’t getting more land to get men to work on or even increase drilling, they’re doing it just for the sake of having more assets. Even if these bills go into effect and more land is opened, much of the land will likely remain untouched, netting few jobs.

#### History Proves: The plan can’t attract investment and uncertainty is inevitable –leasing delays magnify our time frame arguments – this is the most credible source

EIA ‘9

U.S. Energy Information Administration - Independent statistics and analysis - “Impact of Limitations on Access to Oil and Natural Gas Resources in the Federal Outer Continental Shelf” AEO2009

The U.S. offshore is estimated to contain substantial resources of both crude oil and natural gas, but until recently some of the areas of the lower 48 OCS have been under leasing moratoria [56]. The Presidential ban on offshore drilling in portions of the lower 48 OCS was lifted in July 2008, and the Congressional ban was allowed to expire in September 2008, removing regulatory obstacles to development of the Atlantic and Pacific OCS [57, 58]. Although the Atlantic and Pacific lower 48 OCS regions are open for exploration and development in the AEO2009 reference case, timing issues constrain the near-term impacts of increased access. The U.S. Department of Interior, MMS, is in the process of developing a leasing program that includes selected tracts in those areas, with the first leases to be offered in 2010 [59]; however, there is uncertainty about the future of OCS development. Environmentalists are calling for a reinstatement of the moratoria. Others cite the benefits of drilling in the offshore. Recently, the U.S. Department of the Interior extended the period for comment on oil and natural gas development on the OCS by 180 days and established other processes to allow more careful evaluation of potential OCS development. Assuming that leasing actually goes forward on the schedule contemplated by the previous Administration, the leases must then be bid on and awarded, and the wining bidders must develop exploration and development plans and have them approved before any wells can be drilled. Thus, conversion of the newly available OCS resources to production will require considerable time, in addition to financial investment. Further, because the expected average field size in the Pacific and Atlantic OCS is smaller than the average field size in the Gulf of Mexico, a portion of the additional OCS resources may not be as economically attractive as available resources in the Gulf.

#### The perm fails—ad hoc reconfiguration of your relation to neolib undermines critical thinking—the alt alone is the only conceptually coherent approach—this also proves they cede the political through expertism and the logic of fungibility and competition

**Glover et al 2006** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf, WEA)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ **discourse appears impoverished**. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may **petition for a progressive middle ground**, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but **it**¶ **hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy** and politics **is the reasonable social response**. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, **acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals**,¶ **that hardly envision incremental consequences**, would **indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position**.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) **replaces critical thinking** about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” **Even the vanguard of a sustainable** energy **transition seems swayed**¶ **by** the magnetism of **technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast**¶ **and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics**.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the **emblems of modernist politics**.

### AT: Alt Fails

#### All their spillover claims link harder to them—it’s more pragmatic to reflect on social dynamics than pretend we can reform politics from the campus, even if there’s no exact blueprint—this is also a DA to the perm

Pepper 10 Prof Geography Oxford, Utopianism and Environmentalism, Environmental Politics, 14:1, 3-22, SAGE

Conclusion

Academic and activist opinion nonetheless frequently argues that Utopian endeavour is necessary for radical environmentalism and for related movements such as feminism, anarchism and socialism. **Utopianism is important within these movements to** inspire hope and provide 'transgressive' spaces, conceptual and real, **in which to** experiment within alternativeparadigms. **To be truly transgressive,** rather than lapsing into reactionary fantasy, **ecotopias need to** emphasise heuristic spaces and processes rather than laying down blueprints, and must be rooted in existing social and economic relations rather than being merely a form of abstraction unrelated to the processes and situations operating in today's 'real' world.

This paper suggests that by these criteria, the transgressiveness of ecotopianism is ambiguous and limited. **Deep ecological and bioregional literature**, for instance, **can seem regressively removed from today's world.** Anti-modernism is evident, for instance, in the form of future primitivism and the predilection for small-scale 're-embedded' societies echoing "traditional cultures'. **Blueprinting is also suggested by the strong metanarratives driven by (ecological) science. There is a remarkable consensus amongst ideologically diverse ecotopian perspectives about what should be in ecotopia, leaving relatively little as provisional and reflexive**. Additionally, idealism in the negative sense is often rife in ecotopianism.

However, idealism pervades reformist as well as radical environmentalism, and the principles behind ecological modernisation - the **much-favoured** mainstream policy discourse about the environment — are founded on premises that can be described as 'Utopian\* in the pejorative sense used by Marxists. That is, they do not adequately and accurately take into account the socioeconomic dynamics of the capitalist system they are meant to reform. **Thus they fail to recognise that social-democratic and 'third way' attempts to realise an environmentally sound, humane, inclusive and egalitarian capitalism are** ultimately headed for failure**.**

Notwithstanding these limitations of ecotopianism, given that the environmental problems featured in dystopian fiction for over a century seem increasingly to be materialising, it may be that we will soon be clutching at ecotopias as beacons affirming Bloch's 'principle of hope\* (1986).

And what of those who, despite these deepening environmental problems, still maintain that 'ecotopia' is Utopian fantasy in the worst sense, while considering their reformist visions to be pragmatic and attainable? These "**hard-nosed realists**\*, as Terry Eagleton (2000, p.33) ironically calls them, "**who behave as though chocolate chip cookies and the IMF will be with us in another 3000 years time", should realise that although the future may or may not be pleasant:**

**to deny that it will be quite different in the manner of post-histoire philosophising, is to offend against the very realism on which such theorists** usually **pride themselves. To claim that human affairs might feasibly be much improved is an** eminently realistic proposition.

### AT: Method Not First

#### Turns case and shuts down deliberation—implementation focus is reductionist and displaces agency—our argument is that the framework for analysis is itself a political choice

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the ¶ welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state ¶ governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In ¶ other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and ¶ social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, ¶ calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and ¶ disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason ¶ aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like ¶ incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the ¶ behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not ¶ necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a ¶ revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an ¶ internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus¶ operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently ¶ advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case ¶ the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose ¶ functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing ¶ all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. ¶ Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms ¶ through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of ¶ contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic **policy decisions** ¶ (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) **are isolated** from public ¶ debate and deliberation, and **treated as matters of** technocratic design and **implementation**, ¶ while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political ¶ life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. **In the process, democratic participation** in ¶ decision-making **is either limited to an already** highly-**commodified**, spectacularized, mediatized ¶ electoral **politics**, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be ¶ managed through public relations experts. As a result, a **highly reductionist notion** of economic ¶ efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in ¶ need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument¶ proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. **By** treating social¶ subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately **trying to insulate policy-making from** ¶ popular **politics** and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a ¶ political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and ¶ over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all ¶ political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are ¶ affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice.

#### Use the ballot to reclaim social pedagogy—skills and knowledge are force multipliers for inequality unless we prioritize resistance in education—it’s your academic responsibility

**Giroux, cultural studies prof, 5**—Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, selected as the Barstow Visiting Scholar for 2003 at Saginaw Valley State University, named as Distinguished Scholar at multiple institutions, Ph.D. (Henry, Fast Capitalism, 1.2 2005, “Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism,” RBatra)

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that **our responsibility as intellectuals** for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues.¶ **Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy** means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170).¶ Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives. Within the ongoing process of democratization lies the promise of a society that is open to exchange, questioning, and self-criticism, a democracy that is never finished, and one that opposes neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to supplant the concept of an open society with a fundamentalist market-driven or authoritarian one.¶ Cultural studies theorists who work in higher education need to make clear that the issue is not whether higher education has become contaminated by politics, as much as recognizing that **education is already a space of politics**, power, and authority. At the same time, **they can make visible their opposition to** those **approaches** to pedagogy **that reduce it to a set of skills** to enhance one's visibility in the corporate sector or an ideological litmus test that measures one's patriotism or ratings on the rapture index. There is a disquieting refusal in the contemporary academy to raise broader questions about the social, economic, and political forces shaping the very terrain of higher education—particularly unbridled market forces, fundamentalist groups, and racist and sexist forces that unequally value diverse groups within relations of academic power.¶ There is also a general misunderstanding of how teacher authority can be used to create the pedagogical conditions for critical forms of education without necessarily falling into the trap of simply indoctrinating students. For instance, many conservative and liberal educators believe that any notion of critical pedagogy that is self-conscious about its politics and engages students in ways that offer them the possibility for becoming critical—what Lani Guinier (2003:6) calls the need to educate students "to participate in civic life, and to encourage graduates to give back to the community, which through taxes, made their education possible"—leaves students out of the conversation or presupposes too much or simply represents a form of pedagogical tyranny. While such educators believe in practices that open up the possibility of questioning among students, they often refuse to connect the pedagogical conditions that challenge how and what students think at the moment to the next task of prompting them to imagine changing the world around them so as to expand and deepen its democratic possibilities. Teaching students how to argue, draw on their own experiences, or engage in rigorous dialogue says nothing about why they should engage in these actions in the first place. How the culture of argumentation and questioning relates to giving students the tools they need to fight oppressive forms of power, make the world a more meaningful and just place, and develop a sense of social responsibility is missing in contemporary, progressive frameworks of education.¶ While no pedagogical intervention should fall to the level of propaganda, a pedagogy which attempts to empower critical citizens can't and shouldn't try to avoid politics. Pedagogy must address the relationships between politics and agency, knowledge and power, subject positions and values, and learning and social change while always being open to debate, resistance, and a culture of questioning. Liberal educators committed to simply raising questions have no language for linking learning to forms of public minded scholarship that would enable students to consider the important relationship between democratic public life and education, or that would encourage students pedagogically to enter the sphere of the political, enabling them to think about how they might participate in a democracy by taking what they learn into new locations and battlegrounds—a fourth grade classroom, a church, the media, a politician's office, the courts, a campus—or for that matter taking on collaborative projects that address the myriad of problems citizens face on a local, national, and global level in a diminishing democracy.¶ In spite of the professional pretense to neutrality, **academics** in the field of cultural studies **need to do more** pedagogically **than simply teach students how to argue** and question. Students need much more from their educational experience. Democratic societies need educated citizens who are steeped in more than the skills of argumentation. And it is precisely this democratic project that affirms the critical function of education and refuses to narrow its goals and aspirations to methodological considerations. As Amy Gutmann (1999) argues, education is always political because it is connected to the acquisition of agency, the ability to struggle with ongoing relations of power, and is a precondition for creating informed and critical citizens who act on the world. This is not a notion of education tied to the alleged neutrality of the academy or the new conservative call for "intellectual diversity" but to a vision of pedagogy that is directive and interventionist on the side of producing a substantive democratic society. This is what makes critical pedagogy different from training. And it is precisely the failure to connect learning to its democratic functions and goals that provides rationales for pedagogical approaches that strip critical and democratic possibilities from what it means to be educated.¶ Cultural studies theorists and educators would do well to take account of the profound transformations taking place in the public sphere and reclaim pedagogy as a central element of cultural politics. In part, this means once again recognizing, as Pierre Bourdieu (2003) has insisted, that the "power of the dominant order is not just economic, but intellectual—lying in the realm of beliefs"(p. 66), and it is precisely within the domain of ideas that a sense of utopian possibility can be restored to the public realm. Such a task suggests that academics and other cultural workers actively resist the ways in which neoliberalism discourages teachers and students from becoming critical intellectuals by **turning them into human data banks**. Educators and other cultural workers need to build alliances across differences, academic disciplines, and national boundaries as part of broader efforts to develop social movements in defense of the public good and social justice. No small part of this task requires that such groups make visible the connection between the war at home and abroad. If the growing authoritarianism in the U.S. is to be challenged, it is necessary to oppose not only an imperial foreign policy, but also the shameful tax cuts for the rich, the dismantling of the welfare state, the attack on unions, and those policies that sacrifice civil liberties in the cause of national security.¶ Opposing the authoritarian politics of neoliberalism, militarism, and neoconservatism means developing enclaves of resistance in order to stop the incarceration of a generation of young black and brown men and women, the privatization of the commons, the attack on public schools, the increasing corporatization of higher education, the growing militarization of public life, and the use of power based on the assumption that empire abroad entails tyranny and repression at home. But resistance needs to be more than local or rooted in the specificity of particular struggles. Progressives need to develop national and international movements designed to fight the new authoritarianism emerging in the United States and elsewhere. In part, this means revitalizing social movements such as civil rights, labor, environmental, and anti-globalization on the basis of shared values and a moral vision rather than simply issue-based coalitions. This suggests organizing workers, intellectuals, students, youth, and others through a language of critique and possibility in which diverse forms of oppression are addressed through a larger discourse of radical democracy, a discourse that addresses not only what it means to think in terms of a general notion of freedom capable of challenging corporate rule, religious fundamentalism, and the new ideologies of empire, but also what it might mean to link freedom to a shared sense of hope, happiness, community, equality, and social justice. Democracy implies a level of shared beliefs, practices, and a commitment to build a more humane future. Politics in this sense points to a struggle over those social, economic, cultural, and institutional forces that make democracy purposeful for all people. But this fundamentally **requires something prior**—a reclaiming of the social and cultural basis of a critical education that makes the very struggle over democratic politics meaningful and understandable as part of a broader affective, intellectual, and theoretical investment in public life (Couldry 2004).

### AT: Bhagwati

**Neoliberalism is not capitalism – it is the extension of market rationality to all aspects of human life, which actually necessitates constant government intervention that is in opposition to capitalism.**

**Brown**, professor of political theory at UC-Berkeley, **2003** (Wendy, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory and Event 7.1, Proquest)

In ordinary parlance, neo-liberalism refers to the repudiation of Keynesian welfare state economics and the ascendance of the Chicago School of political economy -- von Hayek, Friedman, et al. In popular usage, neo-liberalism is equated with a radically free market: maximized competition and free trade achieved through economic de-regulation, elimination of tariffs, and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to business and indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term resource depletion and environmental destruction. Neo-liberalism is most often invoked in relation to the Third World, referring either to NAFTA-like schemes that increase the vulnerability of poor nations to the vicissitudes of globalization or to International Monetary Fund and World Bank policies which, through financing packages attached to "restructuring" requirements, yank the chains of every aspect of Third World existence, including political institutions and social formations. For progressives, neo-liberalism is thus a pejorative not only because it conjures economic policies which sustain or deepen local poverty and the subordination of peripheral to core nations, but also because it is compatible with, and sometimes even productive of, authoritarian, despotic, paramilitaristic, and/or corrupt state forms and agents within civil society. # While these referents capture an important effect of neo-liberalism, they also reduce neo-liberalism to a bundle of economic policies with inadvertent political and social consequences: they eschew the political rationality that both organizes these policies and reaches beyond the market. Moreover, these referents do not capture the neo in neo-liberalism, tending instead to treat the contemporary phenomenon as little more than a revival of classical liberal political economy. Finally, they obscure the specifically political register of neo-liberalism in the First World, that is, its powerful erosion of liberal democratic institutions and practices in places like the United States. My concern in this essay is with these neglected dimensions of neo-liberalism. # One of the more incisive accounts of neo-liberal political rationality comes from a surprising quarter: Michel Foucault is not generally heralded as a theorist of liberalism or of political economy. Yet Foucault's 1978 and 1979 College de France lectures, still untranscribed and unpublished, consisted of presentations of his critical analysis of two groups of neo-liberal economists: the Ordo-liberal school in postwar Germany (so named because its members, originally members of the "Freiburg School," published primarily in the journal, Ordo), and the Chicago School arising mid-century in the United States. Thanks to German sociologist Thomas Lemke, we have an excellent summary and interpretation of Foucault's lectures on neo-liberalism; in what follows I will draw extensively from Lemke's work.3 # It may be helpful, before beginning a consideration of neo-liberalism as a political rationality, to mark the conventional difference between political and economic liberalism, a difference especially confusing for Americans where "liberal" tends to signify a progressive political viewpoint and, in particular, support for the welfare state and other New Deal institutions, along with relatively high levels of political and legal intervention in the social sphere.4 In addition, given the contemporary phenomena of both neo-conservativism and neo-liberalism, and the association of both with the political right, ours is a time of often bewildering political nomenclature.5 Briefly, then, in economic thought, liberalism contrasts with mercantilism on one side and Keynsianism or socialism on the other; its classical version refers to a maximization of free trade and competition achieved by minimum interference from political institutions. In the history of political thought, while individual liberty remains a touchstone, liberalism signifies an order in which the state exists to secure the freedom of individuals on a formally egalitarian basis. A liberal political order may harbor either liberal or Keynesian economic policies -- it may lean more in the direction of maximizing liberty (its politically "conservative" tilt) or maximizing equality (its politically "liberal" tilt) but in contemporary political parlance, it is no more or less a liberal democracy because of one leaning or the other. Indeed, the American convention of referring to advocates of the welfare state as political liberals is especially peculiar given that American conservatives generally hew more closely to both the classical economic and political doctrines of liberalism -- it turns the meaning of liberalism in the direction of liberality rather than liberty. # For our purposes what is crucial is that the liberalism in what has come to be called neo-liberalism refers to liberalism's economic variant, recuperating selected pre-Keynsian assumptions about the generation of wealth and its distribution, rather than to liberalism as a political doctrine, set of political institutions, or political practices. The "neo" in neo-liberalism, however, establishes these principles on a **significantly different analytic basis from those set forth by Adam Smith**, as will become clear below. Moreover, neo-liberalism is not simply a set of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating free trade, maximizing corporate profits, and challenging welfarism. Rather, neo-liberalism carries a social analysis which, when deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education policy to practices of empire. Neo-liberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; rather it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player. This essay explores the political implications of neo-liberal rationality for liberal democracy, the implications of the political rationality corresponding to, legitimating, and legitimated by the neo-liberal turn. # While Lemke, following Foucault, is careful to mark some of the differences between Ordo-liberal thought and its successor and radicalizer, the Chicago School, I shall be treating contemporary neo-liberal political rationality without attending to these differences in some of its source material (See footnote 3). A rich genealogy of neo-liberalism as it is currently practiced would be quite useful, one that mapped and contextualized the contributions of the two schools of political economy, traced the ways that rational choice theory differentially adhered and evolved in the various social sciences and their governmental applications, and the interplay of all these currents with developments in capital over the last half century. But this essay is not such a genealogy. Rather, my aim is to consider our current political predicament in terms of neo-liberal political rationality, the chief characteristics of which are the following: # 1) The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality, or put the other way around, not only is the human being configured exhaustively as homo oeconomicus, all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality. While this entails submitting every action and policy to considerations of profitability, equally important is the production of all human and institutional action as rational entrepreneurial action, conducted according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a micro-economic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value-neutrality. Neo-liberalism does not simply assume that all aspects of social, cultural and political life can be reduced to such a calculus, rather it develops institutional practices and rewards for enacting this vision. That is, through discourse and policy promulgating its criteria, neo-liberalism produces rational actors and imposes market rationale for decision-making in all spheres. Importantly then, neo-liberalism involves a normative rather than ontological claim about the pervasiveness of economic rationality and advocates the institution building, policies, and discourse development appropriate to such a claim. Neo-liberalism is a constructivist project: it does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of society but rather takes as its task the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of such a rationality. This point is further developed in (2) below. # 2) In contrast with the notorious laissez faire and human propensity to "truck and barter" of classical economic liberalism, **neo-liberalism does not conceive** either **the market** itself or rational economic behavior **as purely natural**. Both are constructed -- organized by law and political institutions, and requiring political intervention and orchestration. **Far from flourishing when left alone**, **the economy must be directed**, **buttressed**, **and protected** by law and policy as well as by the dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate competition, free trade, and rational economic action on the part of every member and institution of society. In Lemke's account, "In the Ordo-liberal scheme, the market does not amount to a natural economic reality, with intrinsic laws that the art of government must bear in mind and respect; instead, the market can be constituted and kept alive only by dint of political interventions . . . competition, too, is not a natural fact . . . this fundamental economic mechanism can function only if support is forthcoming to bolster a series of conditions, and adherence to the latter must consistently be guaranteed by legal measures" (193).

### AT: Trade

**Actually, the global trade regime is a rigged game that just screws smaller countries even worse.**

Michael H. **Davis**, Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law & Dana **Neacsu**, New York attorney, “Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence Of Free Trade Practice, Global Economics And Their Governing Principles Of Political Economy” 69 UMKC L. Rev. 733 Summer, 2001

What is equally or more lamentable is that even assuming globalization offered some sort of formal equity to all nations, we have already seen that getting one's share of that equity takes a certain amount of capital - whether economic, cultural or human - and most of this capital is effectively possessed by the First World with precious little, if at all, available to the Third. That the principles do not match the reality becomes poignantly clear when small countries lament that they cannot benefit from WTO's structures as developed countries can. For example, Renald Clerisme, Haiti's representative to the WTO, complained that small economies cannot afford to use the WTO's structures, such as the dispute settlement procedures, as often as larger countries due to a lack of resources, including the essential human resource of lawyers with international trade law training. **[251](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=8f60c1b8075a05a71bd54ee3fa78f53d&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAt&_md5=2f11c9858944534396229dd33f310b30" \l "n251" \t "_self)** He also pointed out that this is a vicious circle because the size and the training of his country's staff depends on the trading opportunities Haiti obtains. Thus, without those opportunities Haiti "[would not] be able to afford to send a bigger, better-trained staff to Geneva and without a bigger staff, he [could not] see how trading opportunities would improve."

### AT: Market Rationality

**Rejection of neoliberalism paves the way for a sustainable capitalism which respects human values while simultaneously maintains efficient modes of production.**

Robert **Hassan**, Australian Research Council Fellow in media and communications at the Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, “Timescapes of the Network Society,” **2005**, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1\_1/hassan.html

Nonetheless, the truly revolutionary thing about the information technology revolution and the network society it is rapidly constructing may be something social science has not yet given much thought to—the creation of a new form of time and a new relationship with temporality. When we speak of "revolution" it is also important to remember that we are not dealing with a cataclysmic break with what went before. As Karl Marx well understood, **revolutions never are**. He saw the past in terms of continuities in ideas, in traditions that carry forward and help shape the future. Marx, however, saw this in somewhat negative terms, as serving to blunt the revolutionary ardor of the workers, causing them to be timid and fearful of their true potential. Revolutionary socialism is not on the agenda today; but the overthrow of capitalism is not necessary to move to a new digital phase of increased democracy and social justice. The global civil society movement is only one example of what is possible when people, through a developing of continuities from past practices, are able to gain a measure of autonomy over ICTs within the information order. The radical essence of network time is that capitalism, and, therefore, society can become (and is already becoming) disconnected from the tyranny of the unerring meter of the clock and the temporal domination it has developed over the last two hundred years and more. Accordingly, **through the self-conscious creation of different timescapes**—to be intentionally "untimely," for example, as McKenzie Wark (2001) put it—**means that people themselves, acting as part of a movement, or as individuals, can undermine the neoliberal order that shapes the network society today.** They are therefore able to play a part to help shift capitalism onto another temporal and organizational plane, one where the democratic timescapes of communities, of production and consumption and of the diverse particularities of context and culture can transform capitalism into something more humanistic. Capitalism can therefore be a mode of production that is constitutive of a multiplicity of temporalities and of timescapes, ones that are more in synchrony with the needs and aspirations of users as autonomous agents within an open and fluid networked whole.

Éric Alliez, in the quotation I cited above, argued that capitalism couldn't exist without the abstract and totalitarian meter of clock time. The evolution of the network society has shown (in potential at least) that it can. Moreover, it can be a mode of production where—once freed of the temporal constrictions of neoliberalism and its fetish for instrumentalized speed and technological "efficiencies"—the dischrony and risk that it generates can become more harmonized, and the temporalities of power time and potential time less rigidly opposed to each other. In short it can be a temporally diverse and timescape-rich network society where hundreds of millions of culturally competent and technologically savvy users of ICTs can shape it into something(s) we haven't yet dreamed of.